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feminism and environmental philosophy. I argue that human beings are
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philosophy and feminist law.
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INTRODUCTION
In feminist and liberation theory, the misty, forbidding passes of
the Mountains of Dualism have swallowed many an unwary
traveler in their mazes and chasms. In these mountains, a well-
trodden path leads through a steep defile to the Cavern of
Reversal, where travelers fall into an upside-down world which
strangely resembles the one they seek to escape. Trapped
Romantics wander here, lamenting their exile, as do various tribes
of Arcadians, Earth Mothers, Noble Savages and Working-Class
Heroes whose identities are defined by reversing the valuations of
the dominant culture. Postmodernist thinkers have found a way
to avoid this cavern, and have erected a sign pointing out the
danger, but have not yet discovered another path across the
mountains to the promised land of liberatory politics on the other
side. Mostly they linger by the Well of Discourse near the cavern,
gazing in dismay into the fearful and bottomless Abyss of
Relativism beyond it. The path to the promised land of reflective
practice passes over the Swamp of Affirmation, which careful and
critical travelers, picking their way through, can with some
difficulty cross. Intrepid travelers who have found their way
across the Swamp of Affirmation into the lands beyond often
ether fall into the Ocean of Continuity on the one side or stray
into the waterless and alien Desert of Difference on the other,
there to perish. The pilgrim’s path to the promised land leads
along a narrow way between these two hazards, and involves
heeding both difference and continuity.
—Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature1
     This thesis conducts a postmodern inquiry into the ways that the law 
serves as a discursive arena wherein the subordination of women by men 
1 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 3.
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and the domination of nature by humans intersect. The first three chapters of 
this investigation operate on the level of theory, which is to say that they 
analyze how the modernist ideologies of capitalism, Cartesian epistemology, 
Newtonian/Baconian science, resourcism, and political liberalism underlie 
and inform law and legal institutions; and how these philosophical 
viewpoints foster distinct but related forms of domination. The fourth and 
final substantive chapter concludes with concrete examples of particular laws 
and policies which exemplify the theoretical prescriptions of the earlier three.  
     My inquiry is postmodern in the sense that it does not attempt to trade one 
foundational discourse for another. Rather, I ultimately agree with 
environmental political theorist Robyn Eckersley’s suggestion that 
“ecofeminism [should] become a major and essential tributary of a general 
ecocentric emancipatory theory, rather than serve as the   general 
emancipatory framework....[since any such theory] must be one that...does not 
privilege the concerns of any particular human emancipatory movement.”2 
So while the thesis does argue that there are important conceptual 
similarities between the emancipatory projects embraced by ecofeminism and 
feminist legal theory, and that environmental law would greatly benefit from 
the conscious recognition of certain ecofeminist insights, it does not claim 
that ecofeminism exclusively   possesses this ability to analyze the way that 
ecological destruction is perpetuated through law. Nor is it my claim that 
other environmental philosophies do not share ecofeminism’s perspective of 
a fundamental human/nature relationality. Nonetheless, the thesis does  
argue that any attempt to deal with either the problem of women’s 
2 Robyn Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach 
(Albany: State University Press of New York, 1992), p. 70. 
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oppression or the fact of environmental degradation without drawing on 
ecofeminist theorizing is inadequate. It would be inadequate because, as has 
been well established in the literature, the subordination of women and 
nature are historically and conceptually twinned,3 and connected to the 
injustices of racism, cultural imperialism, classism, and speciesism as well; 
therefore uncovering the roots of the environmental crisis entails dealing 
with these “sister” manifestations of oppression too.
     This thesis is also postmodern in that it promotes an anti-foundationalist 
method for thinking about environmental law that has few analogs within 
contemporary culture. My final sections only go so far as to identify 
promising areas where the traditional approaches to environmental law are 
being revisioned in ways consistent with an ecofeminist environmental 
jurisprudence; I do not present a well worked-out legal framework or set of 
principles that can be applied on a case-by-case basis. This is for at least two 
reasons. One is that this is an area of inquiry that is only just beginning; more 
consideration needs to be given to the way that law can better serve the 
emancipatory interests of women and natural entities; and it should be 
realized that this thesis hopes to someday become a dissertation which makes 
a significant contribution to the theoretical construction of such a project. The 
other reason is perhaps more important. Feminist political philosopher 
Alison Jaggar in her book, Feminist Politics and Human Nature ,   4 observes 
3 It has been pointed out that there is some ambiguity regarding the spelling of this word, the word 
could be “twined” in the sense of twisted together, or it could be “twinned” in the sense of a 
member of a closely-related pair. Although my original intention is “twinned”— a member of a pair, 
it occurs to me that these oppressions must be members of a fraternal and not identical set, 
gestated in the same cultural womb, nurtured together, and originating from the same conceptual 
geneology, but with different dispositions, outlooks, and capable of reproducing a different 
memetic (as opposed to genetic) code. Both meanings work however.
4 Alison M. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature, (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1983). 
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that feminist political theory is by nature ongoing; it recognizes that different 
political structures, policies, and assumptions will be less or more appropriate 
depending on changing historical conditions that are themselves    shaped by 
laws and policies. Thus political theory is always “becoming,” and must 
acknowledge its own historicity and locatedness within specific social 
circumstances. When cultural forms and expressions shift, legal theory 
necessarily will too. But it should be acknowledged that changes in law cause  
those things collectively known as culture—values, beliefs, practices, 
customs— to change as well. For this reason law and the theories that inform 
it are never static, and thus an inquiry such as this one is necessarily 
incomplete. 
     Finally, the thesis is postmodern in that it views law narratively, as a 
carrier of cultural stories which, although perhaps never “true” in an 
absolute sense, become the texts upon which we must rely to interpret and 
interact with the world. So this project is fraught with uncertainty and 
indeterminacy, and may be surpassed or supplanted by alternate 
methodologies that repudiate altogether the at least small measure of 
“playing within the system” that my argument advocates. Nevertheless,  I 
believe that it is important to embark on such a project as this one so that at 
this historical moment we may use law as a critical tool with which to 
dismantle the structure of capitalist patriarchy and at least construct a 
scaffolding upon which to hang the fabric of a healthier earth house.
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CHAPTER 1
THE POWER AND THE PROMISE OF AN ECOFEMINIST POLITICAL
ONTOLOGY: FEMINISM, ECOFEMINISM, AND THE LAW
      I will begin with the following definitions: 
           Feminism can be broadly understood as the general agreement that A) 
Sexist oppression exists and B) Should be eradicated.5 
Jurisprudence is the philosophy of law; it is the study of the theories 
and normative values contained in and instantiated by particular legal 
codifications. It is also, according to feminist jurisprudentialist Catharine 
MacKinnon, “a theory of the relation between life and law.”6 
Environmental Ethics is a newly-emergent branch of philosophy 
which  attempts to understand what constitutes an ecologically and ethically 
appropriate relationship between human beings and the natural world. 
Ecofeminism is a field bridging Environmental Ethics and Feminism 
which seeks to explore the conceptual connections between environmental 
degradation and sexist oppression. 
     In this chapter I explore political forms which might emerge at the 
juncture of environmentalism, feminism, and law. The term “political 
forms”refers to ways of conceptualizing the relationship between political 
institutions and the way we live our lives. From here, we can begin to 
establish the tenets of a legal theory which reflects the insights of both 
feminism and environmental philosophy. This theory might be termed an 
5 This is an approximation of Karen Warren’s definition in her landmark piece, “The Power and the 
Promise of Ecological Feminism” (Environmental Ethics  (1990)Vol.12, No. 2:125-146).
6 Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State  (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press  1989), p. 238.
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ecofeminist environmental jurisprudence .       There is already a broad body 
of works which deal with the topic of feminist jurisprudence, the intersection 
of feminism and law; however, there is considerably less literature which 
attempts to translate the underlying assumptions regarding the relation of 
human beings and the natural world expressed by ecofeminism into our legal 
institutions and thereby into political reality. Thus my intent is to first make 
explicit the connections between the fields of feminist jurisprudence, 
environmental law, and ecological feminism. By elucidating points of 
conceptual congruencies among these three disciplines, I intend to 
demonstrate that there is a serious need for scholars in these seemingly 
disparate fields to conjoin forces and address the ways in which gender, race, 
class, and  ecological oppression are entangled— with a view to ending them 
all. 
      Feminist Jurisprudence and the Masculinism of Liberal Law
    Since around the 1970s feminism has made important contributions to 
Anglo legal theory by revealing the ways in which legal discourses and the 
institutions they uphold are particularly masculinist, thereby creating and 
reinforcing gender inequality in society. Feminist legal scholars have exposed 
key assumptions about human nature contained by law, assumptions that are 
basic to the general liberalist ontology upon which law in western culture is 
founded. Liberal political philosophy of the sort which characterizes the vast 
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majority of American political thought7 carries and reproduces the belief that 
human society is comprised of discrete and isolated individuals, relating only 
externally and more or less at will, who because  of their atomistic 
individuality posses certain economic and personal entitlements which can 
be expressed and defined through political forms such as rights-talk and social 
contract theory. This belief I will call the thesis of ontological separatism,   
because it holds that humans are essentially separate from one another and 
especially from the more-than-human-world.8 
      Although the feminist criticism of law is richly varied and complex (and 
this chapter will address some of its most important theoretical positions), its 
primary claim is that underlying the law as it is usually justified and practiced 
is a normative concept of rationalism which privileges and reifies a belief in 
epistemic and moral universality and objectivity.9 This, say feminists, is a 
male  viewpoint, not one universally true of human beings.  In fact, it directly 
excludes the perspective of women,10 who instead tend to experience 
7 Such philosophy is epitomized in the works of Locke, Hobbes, Hume, and Rousseau, who each 
claim (although they reach different conclusions) that the individual is prior to the community or 
the state, that humans possess a pre-cultural essence that includes the exclusive ability to think 
and act according to one’s own “rational self interest.” See generally ed., James P. Sterba, Social  
and Political Philosophy: Classic Western Texts in Feminist and Multicultural Perspectives 
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth,1998). 
8 Chapter 2 will discuss how socialist feminism confronts this ontological fallacy and replaces it with 
a more inclusive conception of the human/nature relation. 
9 Catharine MacKinnon states that it took a feminist perspective on law to expose “a relation 
between one means through which sex inequality is produced in the world and the world it 
produces: the relation between objectification, the hierearchy between self as being and other as 
thing, and objectivity, the hierarchy between the knowing subject and the known object. 
Epistemology and politics emerged as two mutually enforcing sides of the same unequal coin” 
(Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, p. xi, emphasis added). 
10 For critiques of scientific postivism and fruitful deconstructions of the concept of epistemic 
objectivity— the notion that the knower is a singular,detached, neutral spectator separated from 
the object of knowledge and whose perspective is sufficiently universal that it can be accessed 
undistortedly by any other epistemic agent—,see generally Feminist Epistemologies,  eds.,Linda 
Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter  (New York: Routledge, 1993); especially Lorraine Code’s article, 
“Taking Subjectivity Into Account.” 
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themselves as situated in the world contextually and relationally. This 
perspective I will call the thesis of ontological  embeddedness .        Drawing 
from a vast array of feminist scholarship,11 feminists are able to effectively 
demonstrate that while men tend to understand themselves as 
fundamentally separate from others, women tend to view themselves and 
form their identities in terms of their relationships and connectedness to 
others. Thus one of the main goals of feminist legal theory is to explain this 
difference12 in the way that women and men experience themselves in the 
liberal state, and to persuade legal institutions that they will be more just and 
socially efficacious if they take account of the particularities which make up 
women’s (and men’s) experience.
       Feminist jurisprudentialists argue that utilizing what I am calling the 
thesis of ontological embeddedness would produce a better and more 
inclusive model for legal decision-making than the current legal standard of 
applying abstract and depersonalized legal rules, which are considered “fair” 
11 The seminal work in this respect is Harvard social psychologist Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice   
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). Although this work has been criticized for perhaps 
reinforcing the stereotypical notion that women are “naturally” selfless, caring, and nurturing, this 
work and others which stem from its investigations into the differences between male and female 
perceptions of morality remain central to most feminist explorations and arguments for a 
reconceiving and revaluing of the concepts traditionally associated with femininity. Gilligan’s 
concept has come to be called an ethic of care, and has been widely used by ecofeminist and 
non-ecofeminist theorists alike. Other important works include Dorothy Dinnerstein, The Mermaid 
and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise (New York: Harper & Row, 1977); and  
Nancy Chowdorow, The Social Reproduction of Mothering (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1978). 
12 Much has been and continues to be written on the question of whether this difference between 
women’s and men’s experience of the self is “natural”; i.e. biologically based, or is “cultural,” 
meaning inculcated by society. I take the stance that while there may be some biological basis for 
women feeling connected to concrete others, the experiences which encourage this, such as 
care-giving, bodily labor, physical intimacy, maintenence of the body through cooking, cleaning, 
and nurturance are not inaccessible to men except insofar as society does not deem this work 
appropriate for the male gender. Thus men’s bodies too contain this “essential” capacity for the 
experience of interconnection. 
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simply because they purport to be neutral and universalizable. The problem, 
say feminist scholars, is that such formulas (based on what is called an “ethic 
of justice”) ignore legally-relevant difference, especially difference that is itself 
constructed by unequal social relations,13 and assume that all “normal” 
experience is congruous with the experience of the “average” white, educated 
and socially privileged male. Thus the viewpoint that claims to be the view 
that all reasonable person’s would agree upon (it is telling that this has until 
recently been called the ”rational man” standard), is in actuality privileging 
the perceptions and social reality of dominant groups.
       Ecofeminism and Beliefs About Human Nature
       In a manner analogous to the feminist challenge to the notion that 
human beings are fundamentally separate from one another, ecofeminists 
and other environmental ethicists challenge the assumption that human 
beings are fundamentally separate from the rest of nature. In doing so, 
ecofeminists have simultaneously attacked the conceptual notion of a natural 
13 The penultimate example of this occurs within rape and sexual-harassment law, where it is 
precisely because women within patriarchal society are perpetually vulnerable to sexual 
victimization (MacKinnon argues that this is a large part of the definition of “woman” itself), that 
women need legal protection, and yet the law, fixated on enforcing an abstract notion of 
neutrality, is unable to provide the needed protection because to interpret the law from the 
perspective of the harrassed, the violated, the terrorized—that is, to see things from a woman’s 
perspective—would be, according to traditional jurisprudence, “biased” and thus “unjust” (see 
generally MacKinnon, Ch. 9). 
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hierarchy14 of beings, a notion which has conveniently served to posit 
humanity as ontologically and morally primary. In a manner similar to the 
way that men in patriarchal culture view themselves as superior to and thus 
entitled to subjugate women, human beings view themselves as superior to 
the other-than-human environment. This, according to environmental 
ethicists,15 is the problem of anthropocentrism   — seeing the world from a 
human-centered point of view and believing persons to be superior to or 
“above” nature. What I am suggesting here is that there are profound 
similarities between the masculinist (or androcentric  ) viewpoint of law and 
the anthropocentrism which riddles our value systems, and that eradicating 
the multiple structures of opression requires that a jurisprudence be 
constructed which addresses gender and environmental issues 
simutaneously. Ecofeminism, because it argues that there is no way to escape 
14 Regarding the notion of hierarchy in relation to ecology and feminism, Judith Plant remarks that, 
“Within human society, the idea of hierarchy has been used to justify social domination; and it has 
been projected onto nature, thereby establishing an attitude of controlling the natural world. The 
convergence of feminism with ecology  is occurring because of an increasing awareness that 
there are, in fact, no hierarchies in nature. A belief in the virtues of diversity and nonhierarchical 
organization is shared by both views.” (Judith Plant, “Searching For Common Ground: 
Ecofeminism and Bioregionalism” in eds., Irene Diamond and  Gloria Feman Orenstein, 
Reweaving The World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism  (San Francisco: Sierra Club 
Books,1990), p. 156). I want to be careful here to point out that when I use the terms “hierarchy” 
and “hierarchical” I am not referring to the specialized use of the term that occurs within the 
discourse of scientific ecology, which posits a model of relations between biological entities and 
their components that identifies multiple levels or scales at which natural systems can be viewed 
(atoms, cells, organs, organism, species, habitat, bioregion, and so on). This use of the term 
hierarchy in this sense does not imply that any level contains a greater value than any other, it 
simply points out that what we can witness is affected by our frame of reference. Such usage may 
actually provide a check on anthropocentrism. My use of hierarchy is in the ordinary sense of 
considering some things to be superior to other things, that are hence assumed to be less morally 
valuable. 
15  For a discussion of the anthropocentric/non-anthropocentric distinction in ecophilosophical 
literature, see generally: Tom Regan, “The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic” 
(Environmental Ethics Vol. 3, No.1 (1981):19-34); Holmes Rolston III, “Is There an Ecologic 
Ethic?” (Ethics 85 (1975):93-109); J. Baird Callicott, In Defense of the Land Ethic  (Albany: SUNY 
Press 1989).
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anthropocentrism without also overcoming androcentrism, is the discourse 
through which this project can best be extended. Feminist jurisprudence 
would, on this account, benefit from exposure to the insights of ecofeminism. 
Concomitantly, constructing a transformative environmental jurisprudence 
will require that attention be paid to the ways in which gender opression 
focuses and spreads harms to the natural world.
     Feminism and the Thesis of Connection
      In order to undersand the connections between feminist legal theory and 
ecofeminism we must ask what it means to say that men perceive themselves 
to be essentially separate from others, whereas women tend to experience the 
self in terms of a connectedness to other beings. As stated in the previous 
section, the presuppositions of traditional western philosophy are closely 
related to the Cartesian mind/body dualism identified by many 
environmental philosophers as contributing to ecosocial crisis.16 These 
assumptions hold that society is merely a collection of discrete, autonomous 
individuals who are able to function and make choices freely without regard 
to the material and existential position of others.  Law Professor Robin West 
calls this the “separation thesis” about what it means to be a human being: it 
is the notion that human beings are physically separate from other human 
and non-human beings, and that “the referent of ‘I’ is singular and 
16 Cartesian dualism asserts that the mind and the body are two entirely separate substances, and  
that nature is something different from and outside of human beings; mere “automata”  without 
consciousness or volition, and is thereby an external, dead sink of resources available for 
exploitation. For discussions of Cartesian dualism and repudiation of the (female-identified) body 
and nature, see Elizabeth Spelman, The Inessential Woman  (Boston: Beacon Press 1988) and 
Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature  . Chapter 2 will also discursively employ the 
related concept of what Alison Jaggar identifies as “normative dualism.”
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unambiguous, [it is] the claim that the word individual   has an uncontested 
biological meaning, namely, that (whatever else we may be) we 
are...individuals ‘first’.”17 Of course, such individuals may choose    to be 
concerned with the welfare of others, and indeed may be morally obligated to 
do so under traditional Kantian moral doctrines, but the assumption remains 
that persons are ontologically disconnected from one another in such a way 
that they are existentially, epistemologically, and morally independent. 
According to the separation thesis we develop our thoughts and formulate 
our actions subjectively and internally, unbound by and unconcerned (except 
as we willingly choose to be) with the experiences and viewpoints of others. 
     One of the fundamental projects of feminism has been to challenge this 
notion that the experience of individuation or separation is as central to 
women’s self-identity as it is to men’s. Feminist researchers have 
documented the way in which girls from an early age are conditioned to 
understand themselves in terms of their particular connections to other 
family members.18 As Carol Gilligan states, “women define their identity 
through relationships of intimacy and care.”19 They are likely to form an 
identity based on their relationship   to another as, say, daughter or sister, and 
later, partner and mother; thus women’s selves are defined and known by the 
existence of others with whom they stand in relationship. This culturally 
enlargened capacity for intersubjectivity both allows for an increase in 
empathy and a sense of connection with others and   decreases the need for 
rationalistic, universal, abstract moral and legal rules which presuppose the 
17 Robin West, “Jurisprudence and Gender” in Feminist Jurisprudence , Patricia Smith, ed.  (New 
York: Oxford University Press,1993), p. 493.
18 See note 11.
19 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice , p. 164.
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atomistic individual “fighting for his rights” against the Hobbesian aggresses 
of another. Thus feminist political and legal theorists have critiqued 
conventional political doctrines that are influenced by and dialectically help 
to create a world in which the fundamental ontological, moral and 
epistemological unit is an independent, rationally self-interested individual 
human being (who is paradigmatically male), and instead have suggested that 
at least half of the human population experiences its participation in society 
and the world in terms of a shifting web of relations in which one’s needs and 
interests are changing and negotiable rather than fixed and concrete. The 
reasons for and implications of this sense of connectedness for political theory 
I elaborate on more deeply in the next chapter. 
     
      Feminism, Law, and the Critique of Objectivity
     The general feminist emphasis on the contextual nature of experience and 
existence and the conscious recognition that human beings, women and men, 
exist in richly varied circumstances and thus exhibit a multiplicity of points of 
view20  forms the cornerstone of feminist legal theory.  Law serves as an 
institutionalizer and mediator of intra- and trans-human relationships. 
Feminism, when applied to law, argues that it is essentially “male” in that it 
is rational, rule-oriented, abstract, and attempts to apply its determinations 
20 Responsible feminists are usually careful to point out that there is no “one” feminist perspective, 
no single, official party line beyond  what was noted  in the introduction as the agreement that 
women are oppressed qua women, that this is wrong, and should be rectified. Says Rosemarie 
Tong, in the introduction to her book Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive Introduction 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1998, p. 8),“...I am painfully aware that I do not speak for ‘woman’, for 
feminists, or for any wider circle at all. I speak our of a specific background of experience, as do we 
all...” This statement resonates with the feminist injunction to “claim your bias” and also supports 
the contentions of those who say that those in the masculinist tradition who claim or imply any sort 
of objective neutrality are in actuality acting out of a particular world view. 
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impartially, based on the assumption that in order for a law (or The Law) to 
be fair it must be universalizable. “Equals must be treated equally” is one of 
the general maxims of law in the liberal state, a formulation which disallows 
for circumstantial considerations and erases the fact that all human 
subjectivities are postitioned differently in the matrices of culture and history. 
The goal of law is to disregard difference; instead it searches for commonality, 
how a person or case is similar to others and thus can be said to be governed 
according to the same sort of rule as binds another. When judges and courts 
cannot find this point of commonality, or when women’s experience is too 
alien for a masculinist court to understand, the interests of the “other” 
become invisible, and the law does not function as an adequate forum for 
addressing the harms which occur to women. The well-known feminist 
jurisprudentialist Catherine MacKinnon puts it this way:
Many readers [of feminist or standard treatises on jurisprudence] 
(in the Kantian tradition) say that if a discourse is not 
generalized, universal, and agreed-upon, it is exclusionary. The 
problem, however, is that the generalized, universal, or agreed-
upon never did solve the disagreements, resolve the differences, 
cohere the specifics, and generalize the particularities. Rather it 
assimilated them to a false universal    that  imposed agreement, 
submerged specificity, and silenced particularity .       21 
       MacKinnon, referring to the threat felt by men and others who are 
holders of social privilege when confronted with such a liberatory analysis of 
law, then goes on to say that
21 MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State ,  p. xv (emphasis  added).
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the anxiety about engaged theory is particularly marked among 
those whose particularities formed the prior universal. What 
they face from this critique is not losing a dialogue but beginning 
one, a more equal and larger inclusionary one. They do face 
losing the advance exclusivity of their point of view’s claim to 
truth —that is, their power .     And we continue to talk about it.22 
     In accordance with MacKinnon’s suggestion, then, it is the goal of this 
thesis to talk about it, so that our collective dialogue can truly begin to 
incorporate the voices of the many that are marginalized and excluded by 
traditional legal and philosophical discourses.  
 
       Law as a Patriarchal Structure
     At this point we can now discuss more explicitly the feminist claim that 
the law is patriarchal; that is, it arises out of and legitimates a particular 
historically and cross-culturally ubiquitous hierarchal social structure that, 
among other things, subordinates women to men.23 Patriarchal thinking 
privileges the male perspective, and imagines that that which is posited as 
“the other” exists primarily and perhaps solely to serve the male. ( Not 
incidentally, it is males who under this view are the only ones accorded 
meaningful subjectivity). From the blatant denial of women’s full humanity 
issued by Aristotle to the more subtle suggestion of Lawrence Kohlberg, 
Gilligan’s mentor, that women are ethically inferior because they often “fail” 
to reach the “highest” stage of moral development, women, women’s 
epistemic perspectives, and women’s experiences have been systematically 
22Ibid., pp. xv-xvi (emphasis added).
23 Patricia Smith, Feminist Jurisprudence,  p. 3.
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marginalized and denigrated in western patriarchal culture at the same time 
as such male-identified traits as rationality and impartiality have been 
hammered into the social scaffolding as the ideal and the norm. Additionally, 
patriarchy as a social structure is modeled upon a notion of rigid hierarchies 
which are thought to exist in nature and culture.24 And finally, patriarchal 
thinking, according to most feminists, imprints onto experience what are 
called “false dualisms,” including the dichotomies of male/female, 
white/”colored”, public/private, mind/body, culture/nature, and self/other.25 
       Patriarchy values aggression, and maintains its hegemonic power 
through force and coercion, often represented by and acting on behalf of the 
state. Law is the legitimating discourse which the state (manifesting 
liberalist/capitalist values)26 uses to enforce its point of view—a point of view 
which oppresses women (and, I shall soon begin arguing, nature as well). 
Again MacKinnon is helpful on this point:
24 See note 14.
25 Lying at the heart of feminist debates of all sorts are discussions of dualism: conceptual pairings 
which posit radical separation as well as radical opposition between members of a disjunct, 
privileging one side while simultaneously subjugating it’s companion. Although specific entities 
are not actually as fixed into rigid categories as this formulation might imply, feminist writers find 
that such dichotomies as male/female, reason/emotion, abstract/concrete, transcendent/material, 
culture/nature, mind/body, and human/animal nevertheless tend to appear frequently within this 
process. These pairings are, as Nancy Hartsock notes, “overlaid by gender” (Hartsock, “The 
Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism” in   
eds., Sandra Kemp and Judith Squires, Feminisms  (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1997), p. 
159.)  in such a way that the first member gets associated with maleness and masculinity and casts 
as subordinate the female-identified second. According to many feminist theorists, dualism is the 
process by which “difference gets construed as domination,” suggesting that dualistic thinking 
depends on notions of dominance and superiority in which gender and sex become sites of 
struggle for social and institutional power. Dualistic thinking under this definition can also be 
thought of as the process by which the social conditions necessary for the multiple varieties of 
oppression characterizing the present historical moment are reproduced. 
26  The ways in which dominant views of human nature as being fixed and rigid as well as 
ontologically separate from nature and human praxis serve to perpetuate the goals and interests 
of the global capitalist elite at the expense of women and other disadvantaged groups will be 
discussed more extensively in Chapter 2. 
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     In liberal regimes, law is a particularly potent source and 
badge of legitimacy, and site and cloak of force. The force 
underpins the legitimacy as the legitimacy conceals the force.... In 
male supremacist societies, the male standpoint dominates civil 
society in the form of the objective standard—that standpoint 
which, because it dominates in the world, does not appear to 
function as a standpoint at all. Under its aegis, men dominate 
women and children [and nature].... Family and kinship rules 
and sexual mores guarantee reproductive ownership and sexual 
access and control to men as a group. Hierarchies among men 
are ordered on the basis of race and class, stratifying women as 
well. The state incorporates these facts of social power in and as 
law. Two things happen: law becomes legitimate, and 
dominance becomes invisible.27 
     To summarize the discussion to this point, then, feminist jurisprudence 
helps us to appreciate that the law, like western philosophy as a whole, is 
predicated on a deep belief in the ontological separatism of the individual 
who possesses a proverbial “bundle of rights” which protects h i m   from the 
other social atoms “pinging” about in the liberal state. But the experiences of 
women, when given authentic voice, belie the official proclamation that 
human beings are first and foremost separate, apart and disconnected from 
other beings in the world. Instead, womens’ experience reveals a dimension 
of human existence that knows itself to be deeply embedded within a matrix 
of relations. Feminist jurisprudence also claims that law functions as a 
27 MacKinnon, Feminist Theory of the State,  p. 236.
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patriarchal institution28 by operating out of and dialectically reinforcing a 
social hierarchy in which women, through the process of dualism, are 
thought to be and thereby are treated as though they are inferior to men. But 
what, then, might the world look like, and how might law function, in a 
world in which these sorts of damaging notions no longer held sway? And 
what other sorts of things must a feminist jurisprudence address if it is to 
truly and meaningfully break down the dualistic, non-contextualized 
patriarchal frameworks upon which women’s oppression is founded? What 
can ecofeminism, an academic and experiential field which recognizes a 
powerful conceptual similarity between the oppression of women by men 
and the exploitation of the natural environment by humans, contribute to 
the project of feminist jurisprudence; and how could the social critique 
offered by feminist jurisprudence eventually translate into a political and 
social reality of the sort envisioned by ecofeminists?
      Ecofeminism and Value-Hierarchal Thinking
       In her landmark and much-anthologized piece, “The Power and the 
Promise of Ecological Feminism,” ecofeminist philosopher Karen Warren 
discusses what she calls “oppressive conceptual frameworks.”29According to 
Warren, an oppressive conceptual framework is way of viewing the world in 
which “reality” is stratified and ordered hierarchically in such a way that 
some being or entity (i.e. humans or men) are placed “above” and are entitled 
to exploit and/or disregard whatever is “below” (nature and women). Such 
systems depend on the “logic of domination,” a root assumption that first of 
28 Patricia Smith, Feminist Jurisprudence , p. 3.
29 Karen Warren, “The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism.” 
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all there is indeed something which is “above,” and that whatever occupies 
this position is then entitled to physically/sexually/economically dominate 
whatever exists “below.”According to Warren and other ecofeminists30 
women and nature have both been conceptually linked with the realm of the 
physical, whereas men and maleness are assigned to that which is “mental,” 
“rational,” and/or “spiritual.” Study of the traditional western philosophical 
canon quickly reveals that whatever is physical or corporeal is considered 
base, fearsome, and deceptive; thus a perennial goal of philosophy, 
represented well by ancient thinkers as reputable and influential as Plato and 
Aristotle,31 is to “transcend” the physical in order to languish in the realm of 
pure, abstract thought. Any political, social, or cultural system which 
memetically carries and reproduces this belief in the essential dangerousness 
of nature and the feminine and the superiority of culture and masculinity 
must therefore suppress actual women and repudiate its ontological 
connections to material nature. 
     But to do this, to deny that we are embedded in and dependent upon the 
ecosphere, is, as the current ecological crisis reveals, acutely hazardous. 
Through our destructive industries and consumerist behaviors we imperil 
not only our own lives but the existence of millions of other entities on the 
planet. Because ecofeminism insists that there are deep connections between 
the social domination of women and the material degradation of nature, that 
30 See for example, Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature : Women, Ecology, and the Scientific 
Revolution (San Francisco: HarperCollins,1983); also, Susan Griffin, Woman and Nature: The 
Roaring Inside Her (New York: Harper and Row, 1978). 
31 For an extensive and deeply-researched treatment of the way in which Platonic Idealism and 
Plato’s philosophy opposes nature to the human (thus leading to a view of human nature as 
alienated from the natural world), links women to the irrational and the inferior, and legitimates 
social relationships founded on the model of master/slave, see Val Plumwood, Feminism and the 
Mastery of Nature  (London: Routlege 1993), pp. 69-103.
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these are actually twinned manifestations of an oppressive patriarchal 
conceptual framework based on value-hierarchical thinking, ecofeminists 
contend that any attempt to end sexism must also address environmental 
issues, and simultaneously any self-consistent brand of environmental ethics 
must also be feminist. For instance, in a piece examining the content and 
implications of Warren’s explication of the logic of domination entitled “Is 
Ecofeminism Feminist?,” theorist Victoria Davion writes that
noticing these links allows us to recognize that the domination 
of nature by humans, and the sexist domination of women by 
men, rely on the same general framework. Thus, the projects are 
conceptually linked, and the overthrowing of this framework is 
fundamental to both projects [the women’s and environmental 
movements .   ] This important insight shows that 
environmentalists should and must be allies, and makes explicit 
what it is we must work against. If one grants conceptual links 
between the domination of nature and the domination of 
women, it follows that a movement that is not feminist will 
yield at best a superficial understanding of the domination of 
nature, and a feminist movement that is not environmental 
will yield unacceptable results regarding nature. Thus, those 
fighting to save the environment should, as a matter of 
consistency, be working to overthrow patriarchy, and those 
working to overthrow patriarchy should be fighting to save the 
environment.  32 
32 Victoria Davion, “Is Ecofeminism Feminist?” in ed., Karen Warren, Ecological Feminism   
(London: Routledge 1994), p. 11.
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     Ecofeminism and Feminist Jurisprudence
      Since feminist jurisprudence also seeks to “overthrow patriarchy, ” if one 
accepts the basic contentions that first, historically nature has been feminized 
(think, for example, of the common expression “Mother Earth”), secondly, 
that women are believed to be “closer to nature,” and finally, that their 
common oppression is related, then at a minimum, and “as a matter of 
consistency” feminist jurisprudentialists and those practicing feminist law 
ought to also be working on a legal level to eradicate the sorts of sexist and 
anthropocentric conceptions that cause environmental harm. But perhaps 
the link between ecofeminist theories and feminist theories of jurisprudence 
is even stronger than this. Earlier I suggested that these two positions are 
joined in opposing the thesis of ontological separatism, the belief that human 
beings are fundamentally separate, discrete, and autonomous. But whereas 
feminist legal theory stops at insisting that people  (especially women), are as 
much connected as they are apart, ecofeminism extends this insight much 
further to include the non-human world; i.e. nature. Environmental 
ethicists, drawing on empirical information about our world from the science 
of ecology, recognize the biological fact that we live in webs of relationality to 
other creatures and processes in the biosphere, and ecofeminists know that 
women tend to experience themselves as fundamentally connected, and that 
this sense of connectedness is easily extended to the natural world. Like 
feminist jurisprudentialists, ecofeminists readily recognize that such moral 
and legal concepts as “rights” and “the social contract” often are inadequate or 
simply do not apply to those who’s experience is not  one of atomistic 
individuality, such as children, or mothers, or animals and plants. It is here 
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that we can begin to see the bridge between and the deeper relatedness of 
these projects, due to ecofeminism and feminist law’s shared critique of 
political forms that are predicated on the thesis of ontological separatism, 
such as rights. This conceptual similarity can be more easily demonstrated if 
we consider the problems that rights-talk poses for animal welfare discourse, 
an issue of tremendous importance for many ecofeminists.  It is fruitful, 
therefore, to examine the debate concerning what is commonly called 
“animal rights” as a way of exploring more fully the need for the creation of 
political forms based on an ontology of embeddedness.
 
       Ecofeminism, Animals, and the Feminist Critique of Rights
       Animal liberationists Peter Singer and Tom Regan are probably the best 
known moral philosophers who have argued that animals have ethically 
meaningful interests that human beings are obligated to respect.33 However, 
their work has been criticized by ecofeminists for failing to recognize the 
presuppositions of distinct individuality and moral universalizability that 
underlie their social-contractarian type of an attempt to accord animals moral 
standing. Much of this ecofeminist critique basically states the following: by 
arguing that animals ought not to be subject to cruel practices (such as 
laboratory experimentation, or being slaughtered for food) because of some 
trait(s) that animals supposedly share   with humans (like subjectivity, or the 
ability to feel pain, etc.), Singer and Regan actually end up privileging the 
33Peter Singer, A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: New York Review,1975); 
Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California  Press, 1983).
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very traits that are prioritized through value-hierarchical thinking.34 In 
addition, ecofeminists say, such emphasis on the way that animals are l ike  
humans ignores one of the central tenets of feminist thought: the recognition 
of ontological, epistemological, and moral plurality, and the giving of “voice” 
to those that have been silenced by a hegemonic philosophy that has 
marginalized women, nature, and animals. Giving voice to the marginalized 
is also, incidentally, one of the projects of feminist jurisprudence.
     Although most ecofeminists writing on the subject of animal welfare 
appreciate the efforts of Singer and Regan, and see themselves as allies, they 
decry these philosophers’ masculinist emphasis on reason as a means to 
derive “universalizable principles” which ought to govern human conduct 
toward animals. Instead, ecofeminists believe that persons ought to recognize 
the heavily contextual nature of the problem. Philosopher Deborah Slicer says 
that, “These mostly methodological considerations are not lost on Singer and 
Regan, but they [are seen as] superfluous.... But for many thoughtful people 
the question of whether   animals should be used in research is more 
pertinently one of when they should be used and h o w   they will be treated.... ” 
She continues later, “[T]here are numerous relevant issues that are neglected 
by both sides, including this one, and there may well be more than just two 
sides .” 35    
     Animal welfare ethicist Mary Midgley echoes this awareness when she 
argues that there are important differences in the needs, types of sensation, 
34 I am using this term in the way that Karen Warren uses it: to mean the recognizing of difference 
in a way that places greater emphasis and importance on one thing or entity while making the 
other subordinate.  
35  Deborah Slicer, “Your Daughter or Your Dog?” Ecological Feminist Philosophies, (ed.,Karen 
Warren, Bloomington: University of Indiana Press,1996.) (Last emphasis added). 
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cognitive capacities, and social tendencies between species, differences that 
morally inclined creatures such as ourselves are obligated to recognize and 
account for. The present approach, Midgley states, is to attempt to extend 
something called “rights” to a being who has no conception of what it means 
to be an individual in the liberal state.36 The point she makes is that although 
humans and horses are minimally similar in that they both feel pain (and 
pleasure), it would be absurd to treat horses with exactly   the same type of 
consideration given human beings to protect them from harms inflicted by 
another, making rights an ill fit. But a further ecofeminist point is that while 
we cannot completely empathize with other creatures, in other words we 
can’t know exactly what their experiences are, our interspecific biophilia37 is 
sufficient to cause considerable sympathy toward the suffering of our fellow 
creatures, and it is this sympathy, experienced and expressed on an emotional 
level, which ought guide our moral codes regarding non-humans.38 This is 
what feminists, drawing upon the notion introduced by Gilligan, mean when 
they argue that the moral and  legal standard ought to be based on an “ethic of 
care” in which one’s relationship   with, instead of separation from, others is 
valued. 
        Constructing an Ecofeminist Political Ontology
       The criticism of conventional animal rights theories as overemphasizing 
36 Mary Midgley, “The Mixed Community” in The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate, ed., 
Eugene C.  Hargrove,(Albany: SUNY Press 1992). 
37 Biophilia = literally, “love of life.” Coined by Harvard biologist E.O. Wilson, this term refers to the 
innate tendency of humans and other creatures to value their own and others’  life processes. 
(Edward O. Wilson, Biophilia: The Human Bond with Other Species, Cambridge:  Harvard 
University Press, 1984).
38 For another endorsement of this view, see John Fisher’s article “Taking Sympathy Seriously : A 
Defense of Our Moral Psychology Toward Animals” in Hargrove,The Animal  Rights/ 
Environmental Ethics Debate.
24
the capacity to reason can be shown to flow readily from feminist and 
ecofeminist positions: if one embraces an ontology of connectedness then 
rights language is not appropriate when applied to the moral interests of 
animals, or more-than-human natural entities, because the language of rights 
is predicated on the liberalist political ontology of atomistic individualism 
which supposes that we (all those morally relevant) are able to freely 
negotiate with other rational, self-aware individuals in regard to which of our 
“inalienable” rights we are willing to modify or forego in exchange for other 
benefits. Rights theories also tend to claim that rights are founded on the 
capacity for what Mary Anne Warren calls “moral autonomy.”
     Moral autonomy is the ability to act as a moral agent, that is, 
to act on the basis of an understanding of, and adherence to, 
moral rules or principles.... [But] if moral autonomy...is a 
necessary condition for having moral rights, then probably no 
nonhuman animal can qualify.... But why, we must ask, should 
the capacity for autonomy be regarded as a precondition for 
possessing moral rights? Autonomy is clearly crucial for the 
exercise  of many human moral or legal rights, such as the right 
to vote or to run for public office. It is less clearly relevant, 
however, to the more basic human rights, such as the right to 
life or to freedom from unnecessary suffering. The fact that 
animals, like many human beings, cannot demand    their moral 
rights (at least not in the words of any conventional human 
language) seems irrelevant. 39 
39 Mary Anne Warren, “The Rights of the Nonhuman World,” in Hargrove, Animal 
Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate , p. 194.
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     The thrust of this objection is that it excludes non-humans from moral 
consideration because the other animals do not possess the type of being that 
would allow them to participate in political discourse,40 presumably the only 
arena where rights are made meaningful. (There are attempts that have been 
made to overcome this objection, such as notions of legal guardianship, but 
these leave intact the idea that to have rights one—or one’s representative— 
must be able to articulate, assert, and “fight for” them.) Again, an appropriate 
response to this objection, say ecofeminists, would be an ethic based on what 
Carol Adams41  calls “embodied knowledge”—the metarational intuition that 
killing animals, without strong justification, is wrong; as opposed to an 
appeal to some depersonalized, rational, “neutral” principle of ethics founded 
on what many see as a flawed understanding of both human and animal 
nature.  
       Noted ecofeminist philosopher Val Plumwood shares this view that 
philosophies which present their ideas in a mode of discourse which 
privileges the masculinist valuation of the rational, abstract, and 
universalizable—modes which focus on “rules” that on a political level 
become “rights”—are part and parcel of what has led to ecosocial crisis. 
Rights [such as “rights for nature”] seem to have acquired an 
exaggerated importance, and their status as ethical focus, as part 
of the prestige of the public sphere and the masculine, and the 
emphasis on separation and autonomy, on reason and 
abstraction. A more promising approach for an ethics of nature, 
40 Chapter 3 explores more fully ways in which the interests of natural entities can be dealt with 
politically.
41 Carol J. Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat: A  Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory   (New York: 
Continuum, 1990).
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and also one much more in line with the current directions in 
f eminism   , would be to remove rights from the center of the 
moral stage and pay more attention to some other, less dualistic, 
moral concepts such as respect, sympathy, care, concern, 
compassion, gratitude, friendship, and responsibility.42   
     These sorts of considerations are “much less problematically extended” to 
nature than are concepts such as rights, claims Plumwood, because they view 
the self as, and here is my primary point, embedded in relationships with 
others  , instead of either being radically separate or completely subsumed.
        Animals, Politics, Sex, and the Relations of Domination
        One further contribution of ecofeminism to the continued development 
and application of feminist political theory to environmental law is the 
insight that there are important ideological and theoretical connections 
between the domination and exploitation of animals for food, the 
domination and exploitation of women for sexual access, and the domination 
and exploitation of nature as an economic resource. What all of these share is 
that they represent a form of “power over;” that is, the forcible extraction of a 
benefit that accrues from the “object”(the woman, the animal, the 
environment) to the “subject” (the western white male). Since ecofeminist 
theory explores the connections between environmental and sexist 
oppression and seeks to expose the logic of domination common to both, any 
attempt to liberate animals without attention to ecofeminist claims, it is 
42 Val Plumwood, “Nature, Self and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy and the 
Critique of Rationalism ” in Ecological Feminist Philosophies , ed., Karen Warren (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press,1996, p. 160), (emphasis added).
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argued, is incomplete, and so is any environmental ethic. The ecofeminist 
position on animals fits closely with feminist jurisprudence’s analysis of rape: 
when women (animals) are viewed as the rightful possession of men 
(human beings), it is difficult for a patriarchal society such as our own to 
understand what the harm is when they are exploited, or to even know that 
they are. The law treats women as if they are objects available for sexual access 
and economic exploitation (feminists have shown that these are often 
interconnected through the basic institutions of society such as marriage and 
motherhood), and it markets them through pornography and advertising as 
objects of consumption. Likewise, society treats domesticated animals as 
though they are objects whose purpose is to be bred and consumed, and it 
treats nature as a sink of resources existing for the purpose of satisfying the 
ever-increasing material demands of human culture—a culture dominated 
by men and the values of patriarchy.     
     Toward an Ecofeminist Environmental Jurisprudence; or 
     Ecofeminism Unmodified                                                
      MacKinnon writes that women are socially constructed to be weak, 
passive, unresistant to male power, that which is fuckable.43 The state helps to 
maintain this social construction. One sentence in Toward a Feminist Theory 
of the State   says, “Socially, femaleness means femininity, which means 
43 Concerning the link between scientific positivism, political liberalism and women’s oppression, 
MacKinnon notes that, “Objectivity is the methodological stance of which objectification is the 
social process. Sexual objectification is the primary process of the subjection of women. It unites 
act with word, construction with expression, perception with enforcement, myth with reality. Man 
fucks woman; subject verb object” (Toward a Feminist Theory of the State , p. 124). MacKinnon 
further notes that “I know no nondegraded English verb that elides the distinction between rape 
and intercourse, love and violation, the way this term does (p. 252, note 2).”
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attractiveness to men, which means sexual availability on male terms.”44 
Carolyn Merchant, in The Death of Nature,    explains that because early 
medieval Europeans viewed nature and the earth as their “mother,” when 
the proto-machinery of the modern era began ripping ore from the hillsides 
in large-scale mining operations it was as though “she” were being raped. If 
ecofeminists are right that in the present patriarchal culture women and 
nature are inextricably linked, that nature is perceived of as essentially female 
and women are essentially natural (whereas men are cultural) and both then, 
are of course known to patriarchal epistemology as the “other,” then in terms 
of an ecofeminist environmental jurisprudence MacKinnon’s sentence might 
read: “Culturally, nature is female. Socially, femaleness means femininity, 
which means attractiveness to men, which means sexual or economic or 
material availability on patriarchal terms, which means that nature is both 
feminine and attractive because we have made sure through the logic of 
domination to culturally construct nature as weak and passive and 
available/exploitable/violable on male terms.”
       The value of such a comparison is that it explicitly links the sorts of 
ecological harms perpetuated by the human species to the sorts of harms 
visited upon women by the state when it is dominated by patriarchal values, 
thereby enabling feminists and others interested in ending the injustices of 
oppression to better understand the political ideologies with which they 
grapple. When it is recognized that what lies at the root of environmental 
degradation is a set of historical values and beliefs that have conceptually 
located human beings as the overlords of nature, it can be readily seen that to 
44 Ibid, p. 110.
29
place women in a similar subservient position is both logically consistent and 
existentially dangerous. If through our collective and personal actions both 
“large” (our political institutions, modes of discourse) and “small” (our 
purchasing decisions and the foods we choose to eat) humans continue to 
behave as though literally everything    else is here exclusively   for the 
satisfaction of our capitalistically-distorted wants, then we are contributing to 
the unsustainability of the earth’s life-processes, endangering our own selves, 
and immorally contributing to the demise of others. This is where feminism 
and   ecofeminism become so useful, for they tell us that our ethics serve us 
best when they are narratized and contextual, not universalistic and abstract. 
They are useful because we   are storytelling culture-dwellers, embedded in 
context, and intricately and inextricably tied to one another and all of material 
nature. We exist in relationship, with other humans, with animals, with 
nature, and our interest in survival is tied to the survival of other 
participants in this world’s processes in a way strikingly similar to the 
manner in which men’s flourishing is tied to the liberation of women.
     Feminist Jurisprudence and Ecofeminism: Making Connections
     Just as feminist jurisprudence sees patriarchy as the root source of social 
injustice and most, if not all, social problems (including poverty and 
violence), ecofeminism sees patriarchy as at the root of all environmental 
problems. Thus these two doctrines share a similar point of analysis. So the 
minimal connection between ecofeminism and feminist jurisprudence is that 
they share a critique of rights for the same reasons—rights are overly 
individualistic in their focus, when in fact persons are not ontologically 
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isolated and strictly rational. We exist in relation to others, including nature. 
We live in a world populated by other beings. Law forms and informs our 
relationships with others, it defines who “counts” as being recognized. (The 
implications of this quality of law and legal institutions will be discussed 
further in chapter 3.) Thus, when the law does not recognize environmental 
problems as social problems, or addresses them with inadequate tools (such as 
rights language), it insinuates that nature, and what we do to it, does not 
matter, doesn’t count. 
      The discourses of feminist jurisprudence and ecofeminism both identify 
false dichotomies such as sameness/difference, public/private, male/female, 
mind/body as being flawed ways of understanding our problems, and both 
point out that such assumptions actually underscore the most damaging 
features of patriarchy. Presently, however, feminist jurisprudence only goes 
as far as identifying the way in which human beings   have been falsely 
dichotomized. Ecofeminism agrees with this analysis, but recognizes one 
further, overarching dualism: the nature/culture split; or the assumption 
that human beings, male and female, fundamentally operate outside of 
nature. The ontology of ecofeminism suggests that we are embedded within 
the cultural/natural matrix, and it may be women’s unique epistemic 
position which allows for this recognition. While not an “essential” trait of 
women, at this juncture in historical reality, this ontological perception may 
well indeed be a “female” way of seeing things. “A jurisprudence,” offers  
MacKinnon, “is a theory of the relation between life and law. In life, ‘woman’ 
and ‘man’ are widely experienced as features of being, not constructs of 
perception, cultural interventions, or forced identities. Gender, in other 
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words, is lived as ontology, not as epistemology. Law actively participates in 
this transformation of perspective into being.”45 Therefore if nature is 
perceived of as a dangerous, feminized other, then the law actually helps to 
make this so by dialectically reinforcing the conceptual framework of sexism 
and anthropocentrism upon which oppression is based. Thus one of the goals 
of an environmental jurisprudence founded on anti-anthropocentrism 
would be to examine the underlying assumptions regarding nature and the 
relation of human beings to it that are contained and instantiated by law, just 
as feminist jurisprudence looks at the underlying view of women that is 
normatively implied by law. Moreover, any environmental legal theory 
which truly wishes to put in place just and efficacious legal protections for 
nature must expose the underlying social presumption that nature is “dead,” 
“inert,” “an object” and valueless if considered non-economically. Only by 
working to end all  forms of oppression, no matter how and where in society 
they manifest themselves, can the emancipatory goals of both feminism and 
the environmental movement be realized.  
     Conclusion
     The sort of comparison that I have just conducted between the goals and 
analysis of ecofeminism and feminist legal theory is useful in deconstructing 
the conceptual roots of the logic of domination. We still need to explore what 
alternate  political and legal models might be able to accomplish the joint 
goals of feminism and environmental ethics. However, there are a variety of 
feminisms, and not all share the critique of capitalist technologies and modes 
45Ibid, p. 237.
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of production that I contend are crucial to dismantling the oppressive social 
and political institutions that perpetuate sexism and promote damage to 
natural systems. In the next chapter,  I examine various feminist de- and re-
constructions of political theory, focusing especially on critiques of liberal 
feminism and the endorsements of socialist feminism undertaken in the 
work of Alison Jaggar and Carolyn Merchant, as a way of exploring which 
aspects of recent feminist political theorizing might be most useful in 





SOCIALIST FEMINISM AND AN ECOFEMINIST POLITICAL WORLDVIEW
      Alison Jaggar and Feminist Political Criticism
      In her book Feminist Politics and Human Nature     46  political 
philosopher Alison Jaggar delineates four major versions of feminist 
thought—liberal, Marxist, radical, and socialist—and provides an account of 
each one’s prescriptions for political change. Jaggar begins her discussion with 
liberal feminism, describing the assumptions about human nature from 
which it emerges and the way in which these presuppositions determine the 
style and direction of its remedies for gender-based social inequality. Because, 
as we have seen, law in the United States is heavily predicated on the basic 
assumptions of liberal political theory, and institutions and laws, including 
environmental statutes, are generally designed in such a way as to 
dialectically reinforce liberalism’s fundamental suppositions about human 
ontology, this is an important and useful place to start. By examining the way 
feminist political thought appears through the lens of liberalism, we are able 
to grasp more deeply the way in which the contemporary legal narratives,47 
even when they attempt to address environmental issues, tend to reinforce 
46 Alison M. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature  (Totowa, NJ : Rowman & Littlefield, 
1983). 
47 The notion of legal narratives having the potential to exacerbate or ameliorate environmental 
damage is developed in chapters 3 and 4. 
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rather than challenge anthropocentrism.  
    Liberalism and Liberal Feminism
    Liberal feminism, like the general theory of liberalism from which it draws 
its inspiration, holds that human society is an aggregate of solitary, atomistic 
individuals, who possess a pre-social “essence” or “nature” that exists prior to 
their entrance into cultural and political life. This human essence is 
considered to be universal to all human beings, and is not thought to be 
affected by the social conditions which predominate in a particular era or 
age.48  Rather liberals, and liberal feminists, take an ahistorical view of human 
nature, claiming that the uniquely human capacities for rationality and 
autonomous action are the defining features of a human being. These 
capacities are thought to be the traits upon which the intrinsic value of adult 
persons is founded, and leads to the call for “political egalitarianism,” the 
philosophical position that “if all individuals have intrinsic and ultimate 
value, then their dignity must be reflected in political institutions that do not 
subordinate any individual to the will or judgment of another.”49 The basic 
position of liberal feminists, then, is that women are fundamentally 
autonomous, existentially and ontologically isolated individuals who are 
capable, like men, of rational thought and therefore ought to be permitted to 
participate in and be represented fully by traditional liberal institutions such 
as government, business, and law. 
48 This inattention to material and historical conditions puts liberal feminism sharply in contrast with 
Marxist and socialist feminism, which hold that social exigencies and the relationship of persons to 
the means of production not only influence what we call “human nature,” but actually create it. 
This will be further explained later in this chapter.  
49 Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature,  p. 33. 
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      Normative Dualism   
      An assumption critical to the development of liberal political theory is 
what Jaggar terms “normative dualism,”50a concept very similar to Karen 
Warren’s notion of value-hierarchical thinking.51 Exploring the ramifications 
this ontological and epistemological notion has had for the development of 
political theory will help to clarify the conceptual links between ecofeminist 
philosophy and feminist jurisprudence.
     Normative dualism, like value-hierarchical thinking, is a particularly 
western conception that arises out of the work of historical figures whose 
ideas regarding human beings and the relationship of nature to culture have 
shaped the modern era: particularly such philosophers as John Locke,52 
Thomas Hobbes, and Rene Descartes. Jaggar, like ecofeminists Carolyn 
Merchant and Val Plumwood, finds feminist significance in the fact that 
liberal politics (as well as modern science and capitalist economic theory, a 
not incidental or innocent development, as I show below) developed within a 
philosophical framework based on the radical dualism of Cartesianism, or the 
mind/body distinction.53 According to what is termed the “Cartesian 
problematic,” or “Cartesian dualism,” the view that the mind is a separate 
sort of substance than the body, knowledge is acquired exclusively through 
the mental capacity for reason and is a solitary activity undertaken in 
50 This concept, to be explained in this section, I find to be extremely useful in helping to bring out 
some of the assumptions in conventional western political theory which have contributed to 
ecosocial crisis, and I shall use this term in what follows in a sense close to the way in which Jagger 
conceives of it but will apply it more generally to other aspects of ecofeminist theory. 
51 See discussion in ch. 1.
52 For an astute discussion of the ways in which Lockean theories of property have influenced on 
American political and legal systems in such a way that environmental degradation is the logical  
outcome, see chapter 2 in Eugene C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics  (Denton, 
TX : Environmental Ethics Press,1989).
53 Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature,   p. 40-42. 
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isolation by individuals. Furthermore, under Cartesianism, the body and the 
mind are not simply thought to be fundamentally different   from each other, 
but activities of the mind are held to be superior   to and more worthy than 
activities of the body, thus providing the dualism with its normative 
dimension. According to liberalism and liberal feminism, what makes a 
human being intrinsically valuable are her or his mental capacities, 
particularly the capacity for abstract, rational thought, a property which 
according to this view can only be possessed by the ontologically isolated 
individual. Activities associated with the realm of the mental are therefore 
“better,” and performing them is what is thought to distinguish us from 
other animals in a way which putatively justifies their domination. Bodily 
activities, in contrast, since they are considered to be “base” and 
epistemologically useless, connect us with non-human nature in a way that is 
best repudiated, and do not contribute to our innate value and worth since we 
share these traits with the “lower” animals. 
     The prescription for political change endorsed by liberal feminism is to 
argue that since human essence and human worth is constituted by the ability 
to act as a free, rational, egoistic agent, and since human worth is the 
prerequisite for legal and political representation (as we saw in the discussion 
of the problem of applying rights-talk to animal welfare in chapter 1), women 
possess the same mental capacity for rationality as do men and therefore 
qualify for human status. “Early liberal feminists,” explains Jaggar, “saw their 
task as relatively straightforward. Since traditional liberal theory ascribed 
rights to persons on the basis of their capacity to reason, early feminists had to 
argue for women’s rights by showing that women were indeed capable of 
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reason. This has been a major thrust of liberal feminist arguments since at 
least the eighteenth century.” 54 This focus on articulating the ways that 
women are l ike   men has meant that liberal feminists have tended not to 
substantively challenge prevailing notions regarding what constitutes a just 
social order, since the starting point of liberalism is that the good state is one 
which provides the legal tools which maximize freedom for its citizens; 
again, predicated on a notion of the autonomousness of human nature. 
Instead, liberal feminism has merely argued that women, too, on the basis of 
their uniquely human capacity for rational thought, ought to be included in 
the class of beings entitled to political rights. In effect, it would not be 
inaccurate to say that, insofar as the development of liberal feminist theory 
goes, women have argued that they should be considered honorary “men.” 
     Problems with Normative Dualism
     The obvious difficulty with normative dualism and the liberal conception 
of human nature as radically isolated and autonomous is that this view 
causes those whose being is not as clearly separate and disconnected55 from 
material nature to be seen as less “good.” Women, according to Jaggar, are 
especially damaged by this view because of their extensive participation in the 
activities of bearing and raising children, activities executed as much through 
the body as through the mind, and which imply an ontologically connected 
54 Ibid., p. 36.
55 Feminist epistemologist and philosopher of science Nancy  Hartsock states that, “There are a 
series of boundary challenges inherent in the female physiology—changes which make it 
impossible to maintain rigid separation from the object world.” Hartsock mentions pregnancy, 
menstruation, lactation, childbirth, and heterosexual intercourse as instances of boundary 
challenges (Nancy  Hartsock, “The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically 
Feminist Historical Materialism” in Kemp and Squire, Feminisms ). Jaggar echoes this explanation 
for the different ontological perceptions of women and men throughout her book.
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instead of ontologically separate human “essence.”56 Because it is women who 
become pregnant, give birth, and breastfeed, and because it is women who are 
socially expected to take primary responsibility for the care of children even 
beyond the period of infancy, women are at a systematic disadvantage in 
being able to achieve full representation and participation in public life under 
the premises of liberalism.57 These activities are disadvantageous in part  
because they clearly connect women with the realm of the “natural/ or 
“biological” a realm which is, as many have noted, systematically denigrated 
under the western philosophical tradition.58 Women, according to liberalism 
and liberal feminism, are fully human and thus deserving of legal and 
political representation and protection insofar as they are able to participate in 
those activities of the “mind” thought relevant to politics: debate, public 
discourse, and the rational calculation of strategies necessary to maximize 
individual self-interest. Since normative dualism holds that what is 
especially valuable about human beings is their capacity for rational thought, 
persons are not considered to be exercising their “humanness” when they are 
56 At this point I expect it should be plain but I nevertheless will clarify my use of the word 
“essence.”  I am not here suggesting that there is  an actual ahistorical or presocial human nature, 
rather I am using this term to make plain the way that liberal political philosophy is wedded to a 
certain kind of essentialism in its ontology and metaphysics. 
57 For a compelling explication of the way that those who do “dependency work” (care-giving, 
either paid or unpaid) in society are considered to be less than full citizens under liberal 
democratic theory because they are less “autonomous” (a premise for full political participation), 
see Iris M. Young, “Mothers, Citizenship, and Indepence: A Critique of Pure Family Values” in Iris 
M. Young, Intersecting Voices  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
58 One of the primary tasks of philosophical ecofeminism is to make explicit the way in which things 
associated with the body or  corporeal nature have been systematically denigrated in western 
culture and western philosophy, and to show how women have been associated with this realm in 
a  way which has been detrimental to the interests of women. l will not go over the arguments 
extensively here, rather the idea that western culture is based upon the repudiation of the natural 
and the association of this with the feminine forms the premise of my argument. See generally  
Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature ;  Susan Griffin, Women and Nature ;  Val Plumwood, 
Feminism and the Mastery of Nature.
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tending to the physical needs of others, as in, for example, the social practice 
of mothering. 
           This problematic, however, leads us to an important ecofeminist 
insight into the inadequacy of traditional political theory. Human beings are 
not  fundamentally self-sufficient, as liberalism assumes; at every level of 
existence we rely on other-than-human nature to provide the resources to 
meet our material needs and we require the presence of other humans to 
help transform it into usable form. Thus our very being is conditioned by the 
biological necessity—a need possessed by all  humans, men, children and 
women—of relationships with others. Young humans are particularly 
incapable of independently satisfying their physical and emotional needs and 
require long periods of intensive care, and these caregiving tasks could not, as 
Jaggar notes, be done by a single adult working in isolation. But it is not only 
children who require the care of others; adult humans too are dependent 
upon both human and ecological communities to survive and flourish. 
Thus, states Jaggar, “human interdependence is... necessitated by human 
biology, and the assumption of individual self-sufficiency is plausible only if 
one ignores human biology.”59  She continues,
Normative dualism, however, encourages liberal theorists to 
ignore human biology, and we can now see how it generates a 
political solipsism that fundamentally shapes liberal theory. If 
liberals were to stop viewing human individuals as essentially 
rational agents and were to take theoretical account of the facts of 
human biology, especially, although not only, the facts of 
59 Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature,  p. 41. 
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reproductive biology, the liberal problematic would be 
transformed. Instead of community and cooperation being taken 
as phenomena whose existence and even possibility is 
puzzling...the existence of egoism, competitiveness and conflict, 
phenomena which liberalism takes as endemic to the human 
condition, would themselves become puzzling and    
problematic . 60 
      Jaggar has here revealed that liberalist political and legal structures are 
theoretically incapable of taking into account the fundamental relationality of 
human and more-than-human existence, because they take as their starting 
point a belief in abstract individualism that denies that we are dependent 
upon each other and on the material world in order to realize our 
humanbeingness. This inadequacy is not only damaging to the interests of 
women, which is as far as Jaggar takes it, but harms the natural world also. 
Thus through such an understanding of the assumptions intrinsic to 
traditional legal theory, we begin to also see how an alternative perspective, 
and one which is explicitly ecological and takes sexist oppression seriously, 
will be necessary in order to not only thwart impending environmental 
catastrophe but to correct social injustice as well. 
       Feminist Political Theories and Conceptions of Human Nature
I.  A different conception of human nature: Marxist feminism  
60 Ibid. I have italicized the final sentence here to draw attention to the way in which Jaggar’s 
analysis, although not explicitly ecofeminist, arrives at many of the same conclusions that recent 
work in such fields as restoration ecology, wildlife biology, and environmental ethics have 
concerning the paucity of the Darwinian/Hobbesian models drawn upon by the natural and social 
sciences which assume conflict and competition as being the “natural state,” and how such 
assumptions actually help create the kind of world they claim to be reporting on as an “objective” 
fact. 
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An early response to liberal feminism was Marxist feminism, which, 
following the political/economic theories of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels,61 
opposes the conception of human nature as a fixed, static, presocial given. 
Instead, according to a Marxist feminist understanding of human society, 
human beings are “one biological species amongst many”62 who interact 
constantly and necessarily with the surrounding environment and with 
other members of culture. Marxist feminists thereby deny that it is possible to 
make a sharp distinction between human and other-than-human nature. The 
basic Marxist conception of human nature is that human beings are self-
created out of praxis :   conscious and purposeful work.63 Praxis involves 
transforming the natural world in order to meet basic human needs, and is 
necessarily a social activity. Unlike liberalism, which does not consider 
human dependency on other-than-human nature to be relevant to political 
analysis, Marxism understands the natural world to be the material basis of 
life. Marxism also argues that there is a dialectical relationship between the 
kinds of activities that humans must undergo for survival and the formation 
of their consciousness.64 The import of this is that Marxism and Marxist 
feminism recognizes that humans are embedded within nature and that 
there is a series of reciprocal relations that form the ontologies of both 
61 The classic work is Marx and Engels' The Communist Manifesto, first published in 1848. 
62 Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature,  p. 53. 
63 Ibid., ch. 4 infra. 
64 Even human physical traits are socially shaped, according to Marxism: writes Engels, “the hand 
is not only the organ of labour, it is also the product of that labour”  (in Jaggar, p. 55). If Engels is 
correct (and I believe that on this point he is), then what this implies is that nature and humanity are 
constantly undergoing transformation and that the dialectical interaction between human and 
non-human nature will continue for as long as humans are a living species.    
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humans and the natural world. 65 Marxism then becomes a useful starting 
point66 for constructing a political model from which to revision the 
nature/culture relationship.
       With the birth and coming-of-age of the second wave of feminism, and 
especially with the entrance of radical feminism, however, Marxist feminism 
soon gave rise (but not necessarily gave way) to socialist feminism. Socialist 
feminism, “is the name sometimes used to refer to recent attempts to 
synthesize the insights of Marxist and radical feminisms to build a new 
theory combining the best of both.”67  Before explaining more fully the way in 
which socialist feminism may have laid some important theoretical 
groundwork for the project of constructing a jurisprudence which reflects the 
insights of both feminism and environmentalism, it will be necessary to first 
conduct a review of its historical predecessor, radical feminism.
      II.      “Woman’s” “essence”: radical feminism
      Radical feminism is that variety of feminist thought which understands 
women’s oppression as being biologically based, particularly through the 
practices of heterosexual intercourse and childbearing.68 The most famous 
65 It is important to note that even while Marxism recognizes that human ontology is in many ways 
continuous and reciprocally emerging with that of nature’s,  Marxists nonetheless conceive of 
human liberty as being only possible through the appropriation of nature’s “resources.”  Marxism, 
then, envisions  a political system in which the means of production are held in common (so that 
there be a classless society), and exploited equally by all. See the next note.  
66 Marxist feminism is a useful starting point, but not a good finishing point for an ecofeminist 
political theory, since, according to Karen Warren, “Marxists and Marxist feminists place liberated 
men and women, as one class, over and against nature” (Karen Warren, “Feminism and Ecology: 
Making Connections” quoted in Tong, Feminist Thought, p. 267). This also helps to explain why 
certain highly industrialized countries founded on Marxist political ideology such as the U.S.S.R. 
may have attempted to end class-based oppression, but nevertheless continued to degrade and 
despoil the environment.
67 Valerie Bryson, Feminist Political Theory  (New York: Paragon House Publishers,1992), p. 234. 
68Tong, Feminist Thought, ch. 3.
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contribution of radical feminism to contemporary feminist discourse is the 
realization that “the personal is political,” which is to say that every aspect of 
life—the so-called “private” and the so-called “public”—is structured by 
gender inequality, and therefore attempts to alter interpersonal relationships 
within the home and the family are inherently political in that they 
ultimately alter the structure of society itself.69  Radical feminists  agree that 
the social meaning of women’s biological roles has been integral in shaping 
women’s oppression, but they disagree as to whether to valorize or repudiate 
the notion that women are more “overtly” “natural.”70 The radical feminist 
conception of human ontology, however, has always seemed to tend to a sort 
of ahistorical essentialism,71 in which human nature is taken to be a biological 
given and that furthermore men’s and women’s natures are fundamentally 
different. Carolyn Merchant explains further.  
For radical feminists, human nature is grounded in human 
biology. Humans are biologically sexed and socially gendered. 
Sex/gender relations give men and women different power 
bases. Hence the personal is political. Radical feminists object to 
the dominant society’s perception that women are limited by 
being closer to nature because of their ability to bear children. 
The dominant view is that menstruation, pregnancy, nursing, 
and nurturing of infants and young children should tie women 
69 Catharine MacKinnon, “Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,” in Smith, Feminist Jurisprudence ,  pp. 
610-611.
70 This debate has had important implications for ecofeminism, as I show below. 
71 Interestingly, although both radical and liberal feminisms ascribe to a belief in a human essence, 
these essences are nearly diametrically opposed. While liberal feminism conceives human nature 
to consist in the ability to be a sort of “disembodied” mind (the free-willed, rational actor), radical 
feminism conceives of human nature as being located exclusively in the body.  
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to the home, decreasing their mobility and inhibiting their 
ability to remain in the work force. Radical feminists argue that 
the perception that women are totally oriented toward biological 
reproduction degrades them by association with a nature that is 
itself devalued in Western culture. Women’s biology and nature 
should instead be celebrated as sources of female power.72 
      This belief regarding the “naturalness “of the feminine has influenced the 
development of ecofeminism in a number of ways; ways that have been 
extensively discussed in the literature and continue to be a source of ongoing 
debate.73 For our purposes here, however, it is sufficient to note that whereas 
some radical or essentialist ecofeminists claim that women are indeed closer 
to nature and therefore ought be the ones to determine the cultural practices 
and social policy that affect the human/non-human relationship,74 other 
ecofeminists state that the woman/nature connection is an associative link 
only which nonetheless has a long history in western culture; a link that has 
contributed the oppression of women but also, importantly, has permitted 
women to cultivate the traits seen as necessary to forge a healthy relationship 
with the natural world.   
72  Carolyn Merchant, “Ecofeminism and Feminist Theory”  in Reweaving the World: The 
Emergence of Ecofeminism  , eds., Irene Diamond and Gloria Orenstein (San Francisco: Sierra 
Club Books, 1990), p. 102. 
73 For a  recent discussion, and criticism, of essentialism in ecofeminist discourse, see Mary Zeiss 
Stange’s, Woman The Hunter   (Boston: Beacon Press 1997). For an essay which views the 
debate surrounding the label “essentialist” as an attempt to police and marginalize specific forms 
of ecofeminist discourse, see Julie Cook, “The Philosophical Colonization of Ecofeminism” 
(Environmental Ethics,  Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999) 227-247). 
74 Names commonly associated with this position include Charlene Spretnak, Starhawk, and 
Susan Griffin.
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  Socialist feminism and Socialist Ecofeminism:  Merchant, Jaggar, and the
Theoretical Bases for an Ecofeminist Environmental Jurisprudence
      The most plausible definition of ecofeminism is that it is the attempt to 
elucidate the ideological bases of all  forms of oppression, especially, but not 
exclusively, the oppression of women and nature. Alison Jaggar’s political 
philosophy can be given an ecofeminist reading, because throughout her 
work she pays considerable attention the way that women have been linked 
with the body and nature in a way that has been used to justify their 
subordination through the process of normative dualism. In delineating the 
four basic views of human nature assumed by each one of the four feminist 
theories (liberal, Marxist, radical, and socialist) discussed in Feminist Politics 
and Human Nature  ,  Jaggar is able to show how three of the four either 
make unwarranted assumptions about human ontology (as do radical and 
liberal feminism) or fail to fully capture the relationship of social and 
historical patterns of production to women’s subordination (Marxist 
feminism). The form of feminism which most accurately understands the 
source and perpetuation of women’s oppression and thus can most 
adequately address it for Jaggar is socialist feminism, a position she shares 
with the explicitly ecofeminist theorist Carolyn Merchant. For the remainder 
of this chapter, I will to continue to draw on the political analysis offered by 
Alison Jaggar but begin here to journey beyond her scope and attempt to apply 
her insights regarding the theoretical efficacy of socialist feminism to the 
development of an ecofeminist environmental jurisprudence. 
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      Socialist  Feminism and Political Ontology
       Socialist feminism, according to Jaggar, conceives of human nature not as 
“fixed” or biologically given, as liberal and radical feminism do, but rather as 
changing in relation to the shifting patterns of social arrangements which 
characterize a particular society in a particular age. For socialist feminists, 
women’s oppression is dialectically related75 to capitalism, a political 
economy76 founded on the premises of liberalism. Capitalism relies on 
domination and exploitation in order to accrue profits, which under this 
political system is, of course, the name of the game. Because capitalist 
production requires an ever-increasing amount of raw resources in order to 
make the products which it must market, and requires that workers be paid 
the lowest wage possible while at the same time enticing them to expend 
large portions of income on unnecessary goods and services, capitalism both 
depletes nature and exploits human beings. Socialist feminists argue that 
women’s oppression is inseparable from the other varieties of domination 
and exploitation which go on in a capitalist patriarchy such as our own. Thus 
the task of socialist feminist political philosophy is, according to Jaggar,  to 
“develop a theoretical account of these different types of oppression and the 
relation between them with a view to ending them all.”77
75 In the sense that the contemporary context of women’s subordination tends to arise out of and 
perpetuate the exploitive social relations of capitalism. A detailed discussion of the way that this 
actually occurs is conducted in chapters 6 and 10 of Jaggar.    
76 Jaggar gives the following definition: “The ‘political economy’ [of a society] is the complex 
system of interrelationships between its specific forms of political power and of ‘economic’ 
organization.  The prevailing ‘economic system or ‘mode of production’ is thought to determine 
ultimately what happens in the ‘noneconomic’ realm and thus constitutes the ‘material base’ or 
‘economic foundation’ of society.” (Feminist Politics and Human Nature, p. 134.) 
77 Ibid.,  p.134.
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     Capitalism and Liberalism
   In order to fully appreciate the way in which liberalism has contributed to 
the conditions which lead to environmental damage, one must acknowledge 
that, “[h]istorically, the liberal tradition in political theory has always been 
associated with the capitalist economic system. Liberal political theory 
emerged with the rise of capitalism, it expressed the needs of the developing 
capitalist class and the liberal values of autonomy and self-fulfilment have 
often been linked with the right to private property.” 78 Becoming fully aware 
of this incontrovertible though infrequently noted connection between the 
rise of capitalist modes of production and the development of liberal political 
theory—79a theory heavily weighted toward protecting the social and 
economic privileges of white, first-world males at the expense of women, 
persons of color, and the environment— also helps to make more clear what 
ought be the foundations of a political and legal theory more capable of taking 
the interests of non-human nature into account. These foundations occur in 
socialist feminism. 
       Drawing upon socialist ecofeminism as a model for political relations is 
particularly helpful to the development of an ecofeminist legal theory due to 
the fact that socialist feminism, unlike the other varieties of feminism 
examined in this chapter, is not committed to the view that any one type of 
oppression is foundational. For socialist feminists, all oppression, including 
the oppression of women, minorities, and the natural world, is interrelated; 
none is more “primary” than any other and thus attempts to end the 
78 Ibid., p. 34. Chapter 4 returns to this discussion.
79 The connection between capitalism, sexism, and anthropogenic environmental degradation is 
also comprehensively demonstrated in Carolyn Merchant’s ecofeminist classic,The Death of 
Nature: Women, Nature, and the Scientific Revolution .
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oppression of one group, in order to be successful, must address the way in 
which structures and institutions of domination are mutually reinforcing. 
Correlatively, any attempt to end oppression in one sphere will begin to 
unravel the threads of domination knotted throughout the cultural/natural 
fabric. 
     Socialist feminism retains Marxist feminism’s view of human nature as 
self-created through praxis and the relationship of a given people’s 
relationship to the means of production and to the physical environment; it 
thus rejects radical and liberal feminist views that women’s oppression can be 
understood outside of a historical, economic, and ecological context. Socialist 
feminism does not embrace rational autonomy as the ideal as does liberal 
feminism, but conceives of human beings as fundamentally ontologically, 
existentially, and epistemologically connected to each other and to the non-
human world. Socialist feminists believe that human beings possess an 
ontology of embeddedness, understanding that we are inextricably embedded 
in society, in economic relations, and in nature. Socialist feminism also 
rejects the radical feminist view that human nature is permanently grounded 
in a fixed biological essence, but agrees with radical feminists that the social 
meaning of biological reproduction and sexuality has been crucial in causing 
women’s oppression.80 Thus socialist feminism comes closer than any of the 
other varieties of feminism so far discussed in being able to comprehensively 
address the root causes of ecosocial crisis, because it excludes neither nature 
nor nurture in its analysis of oppression. And socialist eco feminism, of the 
kind endorsed by Merchant, conceives of nature as an agent, an active and 
80 Bryson,  Feminist Political Theory, p. 209; Jaggar,  Feminist Politics and Human Nature,  p. 124. 
49
dynamic participant in the dialectic of history and culture. Nature thus 
becomes a “player” within the political process, and its needs and interests can 
become politically accounted for. 
     “For socialist ecofeminism,” claims Merchant, “environmental problems 
are rooted in the rise of capitalist patriarchy and the ideology that the Earth 
and nature can be exploited for human progress through technology.”81 From 
radical feminism, socialist feminism and ecofeminism draw the insight that 
human biological functions, especially women’s biology, should not be seen 
as degrading or limiting but rather are useful and enriching functions of 
humanbeingness that cannot be separated from who we are.  Socialist 
feminists thus concur that disputes between men and women over such 
“personal” issues as sexuality, housework, and childrearing are also 
appropriate sites for political struggle that possess “public” as well as “private” 
ramifications. Socialist feminism contrasts with radical feminism however, 
in that it sees both human nature and the ontology of the material world as 
historically and socially constructed; as the product of changing historical, 
economic, and ecological relationships between persons, nature and the mode 
of production. Thus, for socialist feminists, “Any meaningful analysis [of 
environmental problems or social inequality] must be grounded in an 
understanding of power not only in the personal but also in the political 
sphere.”82  
   This attention to historical and material conditions and the dialectical 
interaction of human and non-human nature is what makes socialist 
81 Merchant, “Ecofeminism and Feminist Theory”  in Diamond and Orenstein, Reweaving the 
World ,  p. 103.
82 Ibid. 
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feminism a useful political theory to draw upon in constructing an 
ecofeminist environmental jurisprudence. Ecofeminism I have already 
defined as a field within feminism and environmental ethics which seeks to 
explore the conceptual connections between environmental degradation and 
sexist oppression. A jurisprudence is an analysis of the ideas, attitudes, and 
beliefs which underlie a particular body of law or the institution of law more 
generally. An ecofeminist environmental jurisprudence would be a theory of 
law that could be used to both understand the sociopolitical processes by 
which women and nature are constituted as oppressed and to help change 
them. An ecofeminist environmental jurisprudence would reflect the 
insights of both feminism and environmental ethics, finding the places 
where the domination of women and nature intersect in law.
    
      Law and Socialist Feminism
      Law is not separate from life; law forms and mediates relationships, and 
through various narrative and linguistic mechanisms such as justicability, 
standing, and precedent it defines who or what is eligible to articulate a claim, 
and thus who or what matters, as I discuss in chapter 4.  Law that is predicated 
on the assumptions of liberalism, as is law in the United States, is particularly 
masculinist in that it is founded on a perspective that has been found by 
feminists to be a male rather than a simply human perspective: a perspective 
in which “rationality,” “objectivity,” and  “autonomy” are privileged while 
specificity and interdependency are submerged. “Liberal legalism” as   
MacKinnon recognizes, “is thus a medium for making male dominance both 
invisible and legitimate by adopting the male point of view in law at the 
51
same time as it enforces that view on society.”83 But these liberalist notions do 
not only harm and exclude women, they degrade nature as well. As discussed 
above, the political theory of liberalism rose out of the same mechanistic, 
atomistic philosophies which gave rise to modern science.84 These 
philosophies championed such notions as “reason” and “objectivity” because 
they gave humans control over the natural world. The only creatures 
possessing meaningful subjectivity under this view are human beings (who 
are paradigmatically male), who by virtue of possession of these traits are 
accorded moral and legal standing. A system of laws that claims universality 
and rationality to be its dearest ideals, then, is theoretically incapable of taking 
adequate account of the interests of non-humans because harm to nature as  
nature remains legally inarticulable.85 
      Therefore, what is needed is a political theory which overcomes the 
ecological and sexist limitations of the atomistic ontology of liberalism but at 
the same time does not posit a human nature which is biologically fixed and 
therefore unchangeable. As well, such a theory must be able to take account of 
the dynamic relationship between human beings and the more-than-human-
world,  and express the meaning of such relations politically. Socialist 
feminism, which subscribes to a historical, materialist, and dialectical 
conception of human biology, is potentially the most adequate grounding for 
an ecofeminist environmental jurisprudence because it  
sees human nature and the forms of human social organization 
83 Ibid. 
84 Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature.
85 For instance, despite the influence of Christopher Stone’s Should Trees Have Standing: 
Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects  in environmental philosophy circles, twenty-five years 
after its publication the American legal system still does not offer a meaningful way to address 
harm done to natural systems that does not directly affect human beings. See chapter 4.
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as determined not by our biology alone, but rather by a complex 
interplay between our forms of social organization, including 
our type of technological development, between our biological 
constitution and the physical environment we inhabit.... For 
instance, the physical environment does not just set limits to 
human social organization: organized human activity also 
affects the environment by draining, damming, clearing, 
terracing, leveling, fertilizing or polluting. The humanly caused 
changes in the environment in turn affect human social life 
which in turn affects the environment in a new way, and so 
on.86 
     Socialist feminism is also most helpful to the project of environmental 
ethics in that it contains an explicit critique of capitalism, a system which 
reduces nature to a sink of resources and constructs people as egoistic, self-
interested consumers.87 In order for environmental ethics to succeed in its 
project of establishing an ecologically and ethically appropriate relationship 
between human beings and the natural world, legal reforms must be 
86 Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature,  p. 111. 
87 See Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1988). 
Plumwood addresses this tendency of liberalist political philosophy as well. She remarks, “The 
denial of dependency on the social other presupposed in the market conception of rationality is 
present in the original liberal account of the individual and of society and the state. In the founding 
fiction of the contract, society is treated as an instrumental association driven by self-interest, 
whose purpose is each individual’s security and the co-ordinating and making available of the 
infrastructure for the market, conceived as the means to the satisfaction of the myriad individual 
desires. The individual’s ‘contract’ with these others testifies to their externality to his needs, to 
their mere usefulness, their inessentialness. For such a lone, self-sufficient wanderer in the 
woods, he who encounters the other only accidentally and occasionally, the well-being of others 
is merely a contingent, mutual arrangement of convenience, not an essential part of his well-
being.... This convergence is not accidental, but reflects the denials and exclusions of the master 
as the representative of reason in the public sphere of liberal capitalism.” (Plumwood, Feminism 
and the Mastery of Nature, p. 152).
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instituted which directly confront the  capitalist industries which perpetuate 
environmental degradation. This socialist feminism is prepared to do, for as 
well as recognizing the reciprocal interplay of nature and culture, it includes 
as a category of analysis the way in which the values and assumptions of 
capitalism and liberalism are reproduced through legal and political 
institutions.88  
      Conclusion: Environmental Law and Feminist Politics
     At this historical juncture in ecosocial reality there is urgent need of ways 
in which to politically and legally recognize the needs of non-human nature. 
As well, we must encourage the institutions through which we live our lives 
and structure our society to foster a healthy, sustainable interaction between 
human beings and the natural world. Conventional political doctrines are 
inadequate to the task because they are founded on ontological 
presuppositions that perpetuate the belief that human beings fundamentally 
operate outside of nature. Much past and present philosophical work which 
has challenged the basic tenets of liberal capitalist patriarchy—especially that 
of feminism—has helped political theory to envision a more socially just 
society; however, these doctrines too have frequently failed to see the 
importance and necessity of including nature as a “player” in the political 
game. Feminist jurisprudence claims that gender, marked by a disparity in 
power between men and women, is as much an ideological construct 
maintained by a masculinist legal system as a biological “reality.” 
Ecofeminism is a philosophical position which explicitly recognizes the 
88 Merchant, “Feminist Theory and Ecofeminism” in Diamond and Orenstein, Reweaving the 
World,  p. 103. 
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interconnections between class, race, and gender-based power inequalities and 
environmental degradation. Socialist ecofeminism claims that human nature 
and non-human nature are not fixed”‘essences” that remain unaffected by 
historical contingencies, but that we can, and do, actively influence the way in 
which the female/male, nature/culture interaction occurs. It establishes that 
the relationships among men, women, and nature are social constructions 
that undergo continual change, that can be influenced for better or for worse. 
Thus a legal framework, an ecofeminist environmental jurisprudence, must 
be constructed that is able to confront and correct these inequalities in non-
exclusionary discourse; a discourse that permits the possibility of radical social 
transformation. This, as I have shown in this chapter, is what a socialist 
ecofeminist approach to political theory is able to do. But how are we to move 
this discussion from the level of theory and begin applying such notions 
more directly to the way that environmental law is actually formulated? In 
the next two chapters I discuss various cultural narratives which underlie 
and inform environmental policy and law: narratives that implicitly share 
socialist feminism’s ontology of self as embedded within historical and 
physical relations, and narratives that reproduce through law the thesis of 
ontological separatism. I do so in order to identify those stories about nature 
(which are picked up and amplified within law) that have the greatest 
potential to harm or liberate the natural world. To identify such stories I will 
use the notions of ontological embeddedness developed in chapter 1 with 
which to examine the ideals and values instantiated in law more generally. In 
final sections of my third chapter, I will ultimately argue that environmental 
law will not achieve its goals of promoting ecological sustainability, enforcing 
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environmental protection, and mediating a healthy relationship between 




LEGAL NARRATIVES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
   
 A relation is a mode of connection. This connection may be 
between people or kin in the same family or community, 
between men and women, between people, other organisms, 
and inorganic entities, or between specific places and the rest of 
the earth. A relation is also a narrative; to relate is to narrate. A 
narrative connects people to a place, to its history, and to its 
multileveled meanings. It is a story that is recounted and told, in 
which connections are made, alliances and associations 
established.
—Carolyn Merchant, “Partnership Ethics and Cultural Discourse:
Women and the Earth Summit”89
     Law and Narrativity
     The law, among other things, is a narrative. As such, it can enhance or 
hinder the promotion of ecological and non-sexist ideas in society. The law is 
a collective conversation that we are having with  ourselves, about ourselves, 
and is as powerfully normative as it is normatively powerful.90 The law tells a 
story; really many stories, reflecting and reinforcing dominant perceptions of 
ecosocial life, perceptions founded on the oppressive ideologies of 
89 To appear in Living with Nature: Environmental Discourse as Cultural Politics , eds., Frank Fisher 
and Maarten Hajer, (New York: Oxford University Press,1998).
90 On the law as promoter and codifier of morality, see generally Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1986).
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anthropocentrism, resourcism, and patriarchy. Feminist legal theorist Patricia 
Smith likens law to a mirror, but a mirror with limited and distorted vision. 
Patriarchy is an all-encompassing worldview, and as an 
institution of patriarchy, law reflects that worldview as well. But 
because of its distinctive features as law—its reliance on 
precedent, which perpetuates the status quo—law is not like an 
ordinary mirror that instantly reflects the reality before it. 
Rather, it is like a magic mirror that always reflects a vision that 
is slightly in the past; that is, it can reflect reality only if reality 
moves slowly. Transient changes are therefore not reflected. Big 
changes or fast changes are reflected only after a period of 
transition. Because law is a somewhat selective, delayed-action 
mirror, feminist jurisprudence is concerned with correcting the 
current lag. 91 
      Most of the time the visions law reflects and the stories it tells, then, are 
the “official” story, narratives that conceal the established discourses of 
domination upon which law relies for its power, by repeating such refrains as, 
“we are free and equal.” “We possess autonomy, rationality, and natural 
rights.” These themes it purports to tell of all of humankind, but in actuality 
provide a linguistic base from which political elites maintain their cultural 
hegemony, as the law “uncritically assumes a traditional male standard of 
what is normal.” 92 The law may also address groups more specifically. “You 
are powerless,” it may say to an old-growth grove, or to a species threatened 
with extinction. It may say, “you  have no standing. The law cannot 
91Smith, Feminist Jurisprudence,  p. 12.
92 Ibid., p. 13.
58
acknowledge your claim.” The law may say to women, “we do not recognize 
the kind of harm you are asserting” as it did, until recently, in the case of 
marital and date rape, and other harms which happen almost exclusively to 
women,93 “therefore it must not exist.” Really, the law seems to be saying in 
cases like this, that “you (you salmon, you forest, you woman), as a center of 
subjective experience, are invisible. Therefore you  must not exist.” When it 
speaks like this, it promotes the interests of individuals and groups privileged 
through systems of capitalist patriarchy, and effaces the voice of those 
marginalized and oppressed. 
      Interestingly (and joyously!), the law can also serve a more subversively 
liberatory purpose, de-stabilizing the master narrative of legal liberalism 
which reifies the individual as an egoistic, rationally-self interested 
consumer, separated from human and earth others. It does so when it 
acknowledges the rights of disenfranchised groups, creating openings for 
voices to be heard that challenge other streams of the conversation. “The law 
recognizes the importance of this relationship,” it may declare, when it rules 
in favor of a birthmother’s right to raise the child she bore over the 
contractual entitlement of the man who in essence rented her womb to be 
inseminated by him. “You count,” it says to the salmon, when a court orders 
that a dam release sufficient water that the fish can travel and reproduce. 
“You are connected. W e   are connected,” it suggests at times like these.  When 
the law talks about human beings, it attempts to tell us about our 
93 Patricia Smith remarks, “It is surprising to think that what a harm is could be open to 
interpretation, but it is. Sexual harrassment, for example, was not a cause of action until very 
recently. Although women employees were coerced into sexual relations, it was not recognized 
as an addressable harm. Indeed, there was no word for it. There was not way to speak of it. It was 
just the way of the world, like breathing or drowning” (Smith, Feminist Jurisprudence, p. 13).
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relationships with other humans, and with our relationship to power in the 
form of the state. When the law addresses environmental problems, it also 
attempts to tell us of our relationship with other things, other processes, and 
about our scientific conception of nature, dialectically weaving a story in 
which we must then dwell. The law, in many ways, situates us upon this 
earth. 
      Environmental Law and Ecofeminist Narrative
      Environmental law as a field is dynamic and alive and very much in the 
process of development. It is an area of social life in which we can see active 
evidence of the human struggle to understand our moral and ontological 
relationship with nature.  Although environmental law is largely founded 
on the same instrumentalist assumptions about nature that characterize the  
scientific worldview, at this moment in historical reality a space is being held 
open, by postmodern science and environmental philosophy, for a 
reconceptualization of the relationship between humans and the natural 
world. Such a reconceiving, expressed through ecofeminism, views the self as 
neither completely separate from and (thus superior to) human and more-
than-human others, nor as completely, amorphically subsumed, but rather, as 
has already been noted, embedded in relationships ;     as existing socially and 
physically in webs of relationality. This ontological perception, this embodied 
knowing, can be reflected and manifested through law. “A jurisprudence,” 
says feminist legal theorist Catherine MacKinnon, “is a theory of the relation 
between life and law.... Law actively participates in [the] transformation of 
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perspective into being.”94 Law is one  powerful medium by which human 
societies translate values and beliefs into material reality; it can provide 
institutional approval and support for particular perceptions and activities, 
while withdrawing nourishment from undervalued others. In a society 
structured and determined largely through legal discourse, environmental 
law and policy should be viewed as a necessary and important means of 
addressing the state of ecosocial crisis being faced by the planet’s inhabitants.   
       Environmental law has been influenced by a variety of sources, especially 
standards of science as they emerge through the dialectical interplay of 
history, nature, and culture.  It is a construct of language, which is not to say 
that it is not “real”; rather stating that law is a linguistic construct implies that 
language is that through which our claims to know reality can be stated and 
carried. Language, for human beings at least, thus becomes the interface 
between our own individual consciousnesses and the rest of the blooming, 
buzzing confusion.95 It is this capacity to express multiplicity, along with its 
open-endedness and malleability, that I believe gives law its power and 
promise as a means of promoting the spread of ecological ideas throughout 
society.
      But as I have noted, the law can tell stories which impair the project of 
creating environmental sustainability as well. This complexity and multi-
faceted functioning of law is reflected in the words of feminist legal theorist 
94 MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, p. 237. 
95 For a discussion of humans as  essentially linguistic, see Walter R. Fisher, “Narration as a Human 
Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument” (Communication Monographs, 
Vol. 51, March,1984). For the role of language in environmental ethics, see ed., Max 
Oelschlaeger, Postmodern Environmental Ethics  (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1995); also, David Abram, Spell of the Sensuous : Perception and Language in a More-Than-
Human-World  (New York: Pantheon,1996). 
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Robin West, who says that while law is to be understood by its content and its 
precedents,  it is also “an ever-present possibility, potentially bringing good or 
evil into our future.”96 West, in her book, speaks of the narrativity of law, and 
claims that particular laws and stories can be interpreted by reference to more 
than one text; that there is more the one source to which we can refer in order 
to find the meaning or proper interpretation of a law.97  However, under 
conventional theories of jurisprudence we rarely do so, instead preferring to 
see established interpretations as “fixed.” Similarly, in environmental 
matters, we often appeal to only one text—the atomistic, mechanistic, 
reductionistic picture of the world given to us by modern science. But another 
“text” to which we might refer would be the one presented by ecofeminism. 
This narrative, or way of relating, says that we are ontologically embedded; 
and it is a story of human connectedness to the natural world. This   is the 
story which law must tell about the nature/culture dyad in order to “talk-
story” into being an existence in which both humans and nature can flourish.    
     The “stories” about nature that human beings like to tell have been 
divided by environmental philosophers into two general categories: 
anthropocentric, or human-centered, and nonanthropocentric. These 
approaches are mirrored in law. Anthropocentric approaches typically view 
nature instrumentally, as a resource to be utilized by humans for human 
benefit, and is the sort of understanding that environmental law, policy, and 
regulation has typically incorporated and enforced. Nonanthropocentric or 
ecocentric approaches, in contrast, view nature as something possessing 




intrinsic worth, and thus an entitlement to have its interests “count” in our 
moral and legal doctrines. But before exploring the narrative efficacy of one 
particular promising new notion, that of a partnership ethic,   developed by 
the ecofeminist environmental historian Carolyn Merchant, we must  briefly 
review present conceptions/narratives of nature held and expressed through 
law.  
     Interlude: A Brief Discussion of Historical and Contemporary Approaches                       
to Environmental Law
       I.      Noxious use 
      Modern environmental law as it first emerged focused on abating what 
are called “noxious uses”or “nuisances”—uses of private property that 
diminish the amenity values (clean water, good-smelling air, nice views, and 
so on) enjoyed by owners of adjacent properties.98 Plainly anthropocentric at 
their core (and thus responsible for hindering the spread of ideas which 
recognize the intrinsic value of nature), these laws are not concerned with 
damage done by particular human uses to the environment per se ; rather, 
suits filed under nuisance law seek to enjoin the perpetrator from interfering 
with the human  use and enjoyment neighboring lands. 
       II.      The public trust doctrine
       Later, in response to increasing interest on the part of the general public 
in using nature recreationally , environmental lawyers fought for and gained 
98 Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Robert H. Abrams, and William Goldfarb, Environmental Law and Policy: 
Nature, Law, and Society  , (St. Paul: West Publishing Company,1992). 
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a new interpretation of the public trust doctrine ,  99 as a means of providing 
natural environments protection under the law. This new interpretation has 
provided justification for the claim that certain landscapes and waterways 
ought not be appropriated by the few, but should be understood as being held 
in “public trust” by the state in order that all citizens might partake of these 
“natural goods.” 100 However, while such an interpretation is indeed a 
promising and insightful use of the doctrine, and a laudable attempt to find 
legal grounds for protection of ecologically sensitive areas, it nonetheless falls 
at its root into the trap anthropocentrism, by claiming that what it is that is 
being held in public trust is the right of the public to enjoy these areas, and 
not that the environment itself possesses a right to exist free of defilement. 
Although such a use of public trust doctrine is likely to afford short-term 
protection for natural entities, it subtly reinforces the notion that nature in 
and of itself lacks value independently of that posited by a human being. 
Thus this view too, while well intentioned, is not the best narrative to rely 
upon in order to properly understand the value of the natural world. 
99 Stated briefly, the public trust doctrine is a product of the common (judge-made) law which 
emerged originally through Roman law, and states that certain qualities of the natural features of a 
land or nation, such as the ability to utilize navigable waterways or receive other uses and benefits 
from natural phenomena, cannot be privately owned and controlled because they and their utility 
must be recognized as belonging to all citizens. According to the Supreme Court in Illinois Central 
Railroad Co. v. Illinois : “It is a title held in trust for the people of the state that they may enjoy the 
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed 
from the obstruction or interference of private parties (146 U.S. 387 (1892)). ”  
100 The most celebrated use of the doctrine in this way is the famous Mono Lake ( National 
Audubon Society v. Superior Court  (1983) case, in which the court was willing to expand the 
traditional economic interpretation of public trust doctrine to include within its scope a 
consideration of aesthetic and ecological values as being legitimate interests which the state has 
the authority and obligation to protect.
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       III.            Standing for nature
      This last approach toward natural systems has been attempted by those 
working in the field of environmental law, one which more closely 
approximates the non-anthropocentric attitude which environmental 
theorists claim ought to guide our legal and moral formulations. This 
approach was pioneered by University of Southern California law professor 
Christopher Stone in a now-famous essay, titled Should Trees Have  
Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects.     101  In this well-reasoned 
and influential piece, Stone argues for the extension of legal standing (the 
right to file a court case on one’s own behalf) to entities in nature such as 
mountains, forests, and waterways, instead of denying that such beings can 
assert a claim of direct harm.102 Stone points out that although it may seem 
absurd and unintelligible to us right now to consider natural entities as a 
“member of one’s moral community,” each time there has been an expansion 
of our circle of ethical consideration—such as when it was first proposed that 
blacks and women are inherently equal with respect to the dominant 
group—the idea has been first met with incredulity, resistance, and only 
finally and with struggle was it accepted as a “universal” and “self-evident” 
truth. Similarly, Stone claims, as more and more groups argue the case for 
“rights” for nature we will begin to see that the differences between persons 
and trees are not morally (and hence not legally) relevant. We therefore 
101 Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects  
(Los Altos, CA: Kaufmann Publishers,1974). 
102 The only alternative currently available to those wishing to represent environmental interests is 
to disingenuously couch the claim of injury in such a way that it appears that two sets of human 
interests—e.g., backpackers v. Disneyland Development Corp.— are at stake. 
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ought extend a right of legal guardianship to natural objects, taking an 
approach patterned after the way in which we safeguard the interests of 
children, the mentally dysfunctional, the comatose, and others we consider 
incapable of making moral judgments.
       Although a less anthropocentric approach than the other two, this 
proposal is not unproblematic either. While in some ways it seems 
appropriate to say that nature has interests that theoretically parallel the 
interests that humans have, in other ways nature is radically dissimilar   to 
humans. Thus, simply mapping human rights onto nature may be an ill fit, 
for this legal method may fail to capture nature’s uniqueness and capacity for 
active agency.103 
             IV.        Land ethics and land-use policy
     The above and other related approaches toward land-use policy in the 
United States are also discussed by political philosophers Lynton Keith 
Caldwell and Kristin Shrader-Frechette in their book Policy for Land: Law and 
Ethics .  104 In chapter four of the book, Shrader-Frechette identifies four 
primary land ethics which can form the normative basis of environmental 
law and policy.  The first she identifies as land-reform ethics,    which are 
those prescriptions that seek to correct inequities in land-holding by 
redistributing land (and thus its products) from the wealthy to the poor, while 
the second model, land-use ethics  , attempts to restrict certain uses that create 
pollution problems which must be borne by the public. With the third, land-
103 See the discussion of animal welfare and rights-talk in ch. 1.
104 Lynton Keith Caldwell and Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Policy for Land: Law and Ethics  (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield,1993).
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community     ethics ,  the law embraces a Leopoldian105 conception of human 
beings not as conquerors but “plain members and citizens”of the land 
community; while land-rights  ethics  constitutes the above-discussed attempt 
to fashion legal devices such as standing that would enable nature to assert 
legal claims.106    
    Though these first two land ethics focus on issues of social justice and 
equity, they raise these issues only as a moral response to injustice amongst 
humans, and thus again reinforce the narrative of anthropocentrism, the 
story that says that we humans are at the heart of moral relevancy. The 
remaining two, however, can be classified as non-anthropocentric, and 
therefore would more suitably meet the purpose of retelling key passages in 
the ongoing saga of nature and culture.  It should be noted, however, that 
although she discusses land-community and land-rights ethics 
sympathetically, as political tools these are ultimately rejected by Shrader-
Frechette as too radical for contemporary liberal political interests to embrace. 
Noting this makes explicity the point I have been making throughout: that 
political liberalism is too deeply wedded to ontolgical separatism to be 
genuinely transformative. Instead of supporting reformist, incrementalist 
models of legal decision-making, more radical political models are needed to 
correct environmental oppression.
     Law as Founded on Ontological Separation  
     As I have discussed in this thesis, there are other, more general ways, ways 
105 Drawn, of course, from ideas set forth in conservationist Aldo Leopold’s ecophilosophical 
classic, A Sand County Almanac  (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1949).
106 Ibid., pp. 51-62
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built into the very structure of the legal system itself, that the law can tell a 
story that inhibits the development of a healthy and whole relationship 
between culture and nature. Taking its fundamental ontological assumptions 
from the mechanistic “billiard-ball” picture of the universe given by 
Cartesian and Newtonian classical science,107  law in the liberal state is 
predicated on the thesis of ontological separation—the notion that human 
beings exist as fundamentally discrete, isolated, rational agents. However, a 
variety of interrelated bodies of thought—including postmodern science, 
feminist jurisprudence, environmental ethics, and socialist 
ecofeminism—are challenging this idea, suggesting instead that we are not 
ontologically separated but are ontologically interconnected. An ecological 
narrative, driven by a postmodern science which repudiates the mechanism 
of previous metaphysical schemes, tells us that we are embedded within a 
cultural/natural matrix, in which we are differentiated, but not distinct, from 
other natural events and processes. And as I have already suggested, this is an 
ecofeminist perspective as well.
      What, then, might environmental law look like if it drew upon this sort 
of a perspective in order to accomplish its task? This question can be 
answered by examining an emerging third position, or way of relating to 
nature, one not marked by the assumption of a radical discontinuity between 
humans and the other than human world that characterizes most 
environmental law. Merchant deems this a partnership ethic ,   and I believe 
it could be fairly readily incorporated into existing political and institutional 
107  Carolyn Merchant, “Partnership Ethics and Cultural Discourse,” p. 18, manuscript. 
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structures.108Although a preliminary exploration, this notion provides 
hopeful new directions for environmental policy. Other hopeful directions 
for environmental law are explored in the next chapter.
     A Partnership Narrative
     As explicated by Merchant, a partnership ethic attempts to avoid the 
problems associated with the extremes of anthropocentrism and 
ecocentrism.109 While an anthropocentric approach, as we have seen, is 
harmful to nature because it asserts that political decision-making need only 
take into account certain (narrowly defined, largely economic) human 
interests which rely on the exploitation and depletion of nature, a strongly 
ecocentric approach may imply what one critic has called “environmental 
fascism”110—the position that human interests, perhaps even basic 
ones—must be subordinated to what is good for the whole of the ecosystem. 
A partnership ethic, however, is “a synthesis between the ecocentric approach 
and the social justice aspects of the [anthropocentric] approach. It is based on 
the idea that people and nature are equally important. Both people and fish 
[or prairies, rivers, spotted owls] have rights.”111  Merchant continues, 
Partnership as a word is experiencing a renaissance in the 
108 Which is not to say that it would not meet with institutional resistance. As Max Oelschlaeger, 
under whose direction this thesis was written, commented on an earlier draft, power is never 
ceded without a fight.
109 Merchant, “Partnership Ethics and Cultural Discourse,” infra. 
110 Peter Singer, quoted in Caldwell and Shrader-Frechette, Policy for Land,  pp. 55-56. This term, 
from its outset, has carried a great deal of rhetorical power, and has generated large numbers of 
essays within the environmental ethics literature to be devoted to defending ecocentric positions 
against the charge that environmental ethics is fundamentally misanthropic. The position I am 
taking certainly does not hold this. 
111 Merchant, “Fish First! The Changing Ethics of Ecosystem Management” Human Ecology 
Review  (Vol. 4, No. 1,(1997)).
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discourse of the business and environmental communities. 
Successful environmental partnerships, focused on resolving 
policy conflicts surrounding local issues, are forming among 
corporations, local communities, government agencies, and 
environmental organizations. Trees, rivers, endangered species, 
tribal groups, minority coalitions, and citizen activists may all 
find representation, along with business at the negotiating table, 
The partnership process offers a new approach to collaboration,    
one in which nonhuman nature itself can be a partner.       112 
     Thus the advantage of a partnership ethic is that it includes nature as an 
active participant in politics whose needs must be considered, without falling 
into the problems presented by conventional rights-talk discussed in chapter 
1. The narrative efficacy would lie in the ability of such language to recast the 
human/nature relationship from one of separation and exploitation to one of 
active and equal co-operation. A partnership ethic treats nature as a living 
subject, and as something containing inherent worth.113 But a partnership 
ethic also recognizes human needs and interests, and thereby would be an 
important ingredient in fashioning a comprehensive ecofeminist 
environmental jurisprudence. “[Environmental] law,” note Caldwell and 
Schrader-Frechette, “like all other legislation, is culturally derived and is 
reflective of politically dominant social attitudes and conventions. When 
social attitudes change to form an altered critical mass of activated public 
opinion, the law will follow even though belatedly. Once adopted, law often 
112 Merchant, “Partnership Ethics and Cultural Discourse,” p. 2, manuscript (emphasis added). 
113  Ibid., p. 7
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affects attitudes—more often behaviors.”114 Again, it is this dialectic between 
conceptual frameworks, attitudes, and personal and social action that cast law 
as such a powerful medium for rectifying (or encouraging) environmental 
degradation. We must, for the health of ourselves and the planet, find 
alternate narratives.
   
     Conclusion
     The law, then, dialectically reflects and creates dominant perceptions of the 
world.  The law “actively transforms perspective into being.” Our being is our 
ontology; thus law serves not just as abstraction or convention, it actually 
shapes the way we are able to be in the world. The law, as a creator and 
mediator of relationships, influences these relationships to be healthy or 
damaged. The world is in need of narratives which can re-tell the story of 
human situatedness within the natural world, one in which human 
embeddedness within nature is acknowledged.  And while some narratives 
tell a tale of human superiority and reinforce destruction and exploitation, 
others are transformative, envisioning a cooperative and mutually-beneficial 
interchange between humans and nature. In my next and final substantive 
chapter, then,  I will investigate more directly the ways that the law can 
accomplish this constructive task and tell that story which is best for all 
involved. 
114 Caldwell and Shrader-Frechette, Policy for Land,  p. 135. 
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CHAPTER 4
CONSTRUCTIVE STRANDS WITHIN A POSTMODERN LEGAL
NARRATIVE;
OR,
HOW TO BUILD AN ECOFEMINIST ENVIRONMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE
Feminist analysis is appropriate to any area, concepts, relations, 
and institutions of law, and many legal theorists offer feminist 
critiques of standard legal categories.... Clearly, the issues 
covered by feminist jurisprudence are as wide ranging as the 
areas covered by law. 
—Patricia Smith, Feminist Jurisprudence  115 
     Law and Ecological Narrative
     Law, as I have argued, can be thought of as a narrative, a story told by 
human culture-dwellers which reproduces the dominant perceptions of 
modernity, keeping particular ideologies alive even at a time when society is 
undergoing shifts in the way in which it constructs the subjects and the 
objects of the world. Indeed, the law’s propensity for conservatism, its 
foundational role in maintaining the status quo and perpetuating established 
power-structures and the interests of ruling elites is legend, as is evinced by 
115 Patricia Smith, Feminist Jurisprudence, p. 4.
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the inescapability of the jurisprudential doctrine of stare decisis —  the 
obligation to act in a manner consistent with past rulings—by which every 
judge is thought to be bound. MacKinnon explains that,
Substantive doctrines like standing, justicability, and state action 
adopt the [viewpoint of patriarchy]. Those with power in civil 
society, not women [or natural entities], design its norms and 
institutions, which become the status quo. Those with power, 
not usually women [and never other-than-human beings], write 
constitutions, which become law’s highest standards. Those with 
power in political systems that women did not design and from 
which women [and those linked with women] have been 
excluded write legislation, which sets ruling values. Then, 
jurisprudentially, judicial review is said to go beyond its proper 
scope...[when it] scrutinize[s] the underlying substance.116 
     But in an apparent paradox,117 law carries transformative possibility as well, 
and can serve as a critical tool for radically changing the way in which 
humans inhabit their world.  As Patricia Smith states in the introduction to 
her edited volume,
Feminists have made practical suggestions for enhancing the 
116 MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, p. 238.
117 Think, for example, of the way in which Brown v. Board of Education  is typically (and rightfully) 
understood as a way in which society is morally improved through the power of law, and as a time 
when the law saw things through the perspecive of the disenfranchized. MacKinnon notes that it 
is precisely at such moments that law is revealed as perspectival and partial, instead of universal 
and neutral. “The point of view of a total system emerges as particular only when confronted, in a 
way it cannot ignore, by a demand from another point of view. This is why epistemolgy must be 
controlled for ontological dominance to succeed.... When seemingly ontological conditions are 
challenged from the collective standpoint of a dissident reality, they become visible as 
epistemological.  Dominance suddenly appears no longer inevitable. When it loses its ground it 
loses its grip” (Ibid., pp. 239-240).
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possibility [of legal justice for all] by recognizing the 
nonneutrality of law and enlisting views that often go 
unheard .... [I]t is not reasonable or  just to adhere to old legal 
methods that limit what counts as a cause of action, what and 
who can be considered, who can be heard, what can be thought, 
and what counts as a legal judgment. New methods of legal 
reasoning must be advanced      that can open up the process to 
provide truly equal access and genuinely equal consideration for 
all.118 
     When the law talks about human beings, it attempts to tell us about our 
relationships with other humans, and our relationship to institutionalized 
power that we know in the form of the state. When the law addresses 
environmental issues, it also attempts to tell us of our relationship with 
others things, other processes, and thus implicitly the law reveals our 
scientific and normative conceptions of nature. Thus, as I have been arguing, 
the law situates us within the nature/culture dialectic by weaving a narrative 
through which we live out our lives. 
      Since the law operates dialectically, that is, it tends to pick up and amplify 
debates occurring within the many cultural narratives, thus influencing and 
being influenced by the myriad cultural codes extant at a particular historical 
juncture, it both creates alternative and reflects dominant perceptions of the 
world. The law, in the words of MacKinnon, then “translates these 
perceptions into being”  by legitimating some relationships, reifying them 
institutionally, while negating others, reducing their public status as well as 
118 Smith, Feminist Jurisprudence, pp. 13-14 (emphasis added).
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their efficacy. As I have argued, the law influences the relationship between 
humans and nature by refining and codifying particular strands of the 
nature/culture narrative. Within environmental law as it stands there are 
competing strands, and indeed judges and courts in particular are able to draw 
upon disparate stories about the human relationship with nature.119  Some 
narratives tell a tale of human superiority and reinforce attitudes of 
destructiveness and exploitation, others are transformative, envisioning a 
cooperative interchange between humans and the rest of the natural world. 
The project of environmental ethics is to construct ecologically and ethically 
appropriate ways for human beings to live their lives in consort with nature, 
and the project of ecofeminism is to confront the discourses of dominance 
which link sexist oppression and environmental degradation. In accord with 
these projects, I will for the duration of this chapter attempt to uncover 
specific narratives within the tapestry of Anglo law which are re-telling the 
story of human situatedness within the natural world, narratives in which 
our embeddedness within nature is acknowledged.  By examining particular 
119 Although it will not be discussed here, there are at least three theories of jurisprudence which 
explain what law is and what it ought to do: that is, how judges ought to  interpret and apply the 
law. The first of these is legal positivism , often associated with H.L.A  Hart, which claims that the 
law is what ever system of rules jurists say it is; contrasted with a theory of law best articulated by 
Ronald Dworkin, who claims that the law is permeated with and thus refers to moral values held by 
the community at large. A third and more radical conception of  jurisprudence, Critical Legal 
Studies (CLS), rejects the conventional distinction between adjudication and politics, asserting 
that because society itself is not undivided concerning its values and beliefs and there are at any 
given time in any given case competing strands of thought concerning the proper course of 
action, there is a fundamental indeterminacy within the law which cannot be resolved by appealing 
to an outside set of fixed principles. Instead, “the spectrum of ideological controversy in politics is 
reproduced in the law” (Andrew Altman, “Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin,” 
(Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 15, No. 3, (1986) pp. 205-236). What this means in practical 
terms is that so long as a particular point of view is represented somewhere in the patchwork of 
cultural thought, a judge is “free” to read her or his favored theory into the law. In this sense, the 
law emerges as open and fluid, and judges and courts thus very much participate in larger political 
debates which arise from and influence culture. 
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laws, court cases, and elements of contemporary legal theory, I will finish the 
substance of this thesis by bringing the insights which can be gleaned from 
ecofeminism to bear on the question of what exactly a postmodern approach 
to law might be, and how the law indeed might tell that story which is best for 
all  involved.
     Wetlands, Regulatory Takings, and the Conceptual Foundations of  
Property Law
       One way in which humanity expresses its conception of the relationship 
between itself and the rest of nature is through property law. In a 1995 UCLA 
Law Review    article, Eric  Freyfogle discusses the tension between 
conventional notions of the sacrosanct nature of private property and rising 
public awareness of the importance of  environmental health, specifically 
through the problem of wetlands protection.120  Wetlands are ecologically 
sensitive areas that perform filtering functions and host species not found on 
either dry land or in waterways. Like other areas of special ecological 
importance—barrier islands, endangered species habitats, riparian corridors, 
biome crossings, and the like—when wetlands are severely altered the 
environmental repercussions tend not to remain localized but rather ripple 
widely throughout an ecosystem, often affecting other organisms and land 
forms in unpredictable and deleterious ways.121 Until the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act was first enacted in 1972, the law, reflecting the 
dominant perceptions of the time, failed to recognize the ecological 
120 Eric T. Freyfogle, “ The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands” UCLA Law Review   (Vol. 43, 
No. 1, (1995)), pp. 77-138.
121 Ibid, p. 78. 
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importance of these areas, and landowners eagerly proceeded to drain and fill 
them for more economically-beneficial uses “as if on a moral crusade.”122  
Over time, however, a patchy body of law has emerged in the United States in 
response to a growing awareness that human beings cannot ceaselessly alter 
the “natural character”123 of the land with impunity. The evolution and 
current state of this law may provide some important insights into 
postmodern trends within environmental law. 
     In most wetlands cases,124 the legal issue, and the one considered 
justicable,125 is whether or not a governmental agency can implement 
regulations constraining the ability of private landowners to drain and then 
develop property situated upon wetlands without having to pay  “just 
compensation” as required under the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.126 A “takings” is generally defined as 
the seizure of private lands for public benefit such that the owner is deprived 
of control and present and future economic return. While originally designed 
to prevent uncompensated physical appropriation, a taking can also occur 
when regulations are passed which diminish the economic viability of the 
122 Ibid, p. 79.
123 This is one of the key terms used in the New Zealand Resource Management Act, which will be 
discussed in the next section.
124 Specific cases informing the discussion here  include Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 
(112 s. Ct. 2886 (1992)), Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States (28 F.3d 1171 Fed. Cir. (1994)), 
and Rowe v. Town of North Hampton (553 A.2d 1331 (N.H. 1989))
125 Able to be decided upon in a reasoned way by a court of law.
126 The relevant clause reads, “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.” 
(Constitution , amend. V, Sec. 1).
77
parcel.127 In wetlands cases, plaintiffs typically argue that in the enactment of 
environmental regulations designed to protect the ecosystem, exactly such a 
thing has occurred: the plaintiff (land-owner) has been deprived of the 
economic benefit which was expected, and thus she or he should be paid an 
amount equivalent to what could be received if the land were put to its 
“economically best” use.128 The chilling effect rulings favorable to the 
landowners might have on the development of an ecocentric environmental 
law is now apparent: if such regulations are frequently ruled a “taking,” then 
federal and local governmental agencies risk having to pay large sums to 
private parties each time environmental protection is sought. And 
unfortunately, rulings have been favorable to the plaintiffs in many cases.129  
However, Freyfogle’s analysis presents a compelling examination of the way 
in which the growing popular recognition of the moral and ecological 
127 The case which established this principle is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon   (1922)  in which 
the Supreme Court, in asking whether or not a state regulation which denied a private coal mining 
company the right to extract coal from lands which lay underneath public structures when such an 
action might jeopardize the integrity of such structures constituted a taking, ruled that 
“Government could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be 
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law...[But] the general rule at least 
is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.” (260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158)
128 Freyfogle, pp. 77-94 infra.
129 A precedent-setting example is Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council  (112 S.Ct. 2886), 
decided in 1992, in which the high court, led by Justice Scalia, determined that if a property 
owner’s “reasonable expectations” regarding economic use of the land were thwarted by the 
enactment of governmental regulations, then regardless of the extent of public benefit, the 
takings must be compensated. Although this indeed set a poor precedent for environmental 
interests, this case also demonstrates cause for hope for change in legal reasoning, as Justice 
Stevens argued in the dissent that “The human condition is one of constant learning and 
evolution—both moral and practical. Legislatures implement that new learning; in doing so they 
must often revise the definition of property and the rights of property owners. Thus, when the 
Nation came to understand that slavery was morally wrong and mandated the emancipation of all 
slaves, it, in effect, redefined “property.” On a lesser scale, our ongoing self-education produces 
similar changes in the rights of property owners. New appreciation of the significance of 
endangered species; the importance of wetlands, and the vulnerability of coastal lands, shapes 
our evolving understanding of property rights”  (J. Stevens, dissenting opinion, Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council  ).
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importance of the land community is challenging traditional, long-held 
notions about the relationship of human beings to nature, and how such 
shifts may be ushering in “a fundamentally new way, an ecological way, of 
thinking about owning the land.”130  
     Freyfogle notes that the legal tension between property owners and 
regulatory agencies arises because of the conflict between traditional Lockean 
conceptions of land-as-property, an ownable object to be utilized for human 
benefit, and what I am defining as postmodern and ecofeminist conceptions 
of the land as a living, changing, system in which humans are ontologically 
embedded. In describing the conceptual and historical development of 
property law, Freyfogle states,
The pronounced tendency to view land as commodity coincided 
with and helped foster the abstraction of landed property in legal 
thinking, a...path leading to present day conflict. In nature’s 
economy, each acre had distinct features; each parcel formed part 
of a diverse, living community. In the law, on the other hand, 
property became a disembodied idea... Property was not the thing 
itself but the owner’s powers over the thing, a bundle of rights as 
against all other people to control, use, consume, and transfer 
without interference by outsiders.131 
       Thus, Freyfogle’s argument suggests how the combined project of a 
postmodern environmental philosophy and feminist jurisprudence might be 
quite useful in deconstructing some of the ways ecosocial crisis is perpetuated 
through social institutions. Although postmodernists typically defy 
130 Freyfogle, p. 79.
131 Ibid., p. 97.
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methodological categorization, they generally reject the notion that there are 
abstract, universal truths which exist outside of history and cultural linguistic 
constructions, and note that a plethora of power-claims lie concealed within 
supposedly neutral discourses.132 The attempt to see land not as an ecologically 
contextualized thing but rather as tabula rasa   through which abstract notions 
of property, individualism, and rights can be expressed shows itself as party to 
exactly such a project, and is thus revealed as perpetuation of a modernist 
“master narrative,” privileging the elites whose interests it serves itself by 
effacing alternate perspectives.  Freyfogle continues, 
 As lawyers and economists considered the matter more and 
more, property lost its tethers with any particular spot on the 
landscape; it became an imaginary ideal, unrelated to the natural 
world. In the world of theory, an owner’s legal rights 
transcended the details of place to take on an independent 
existence. The rights of ownership meant the same without 
regard for place of person; each parcel was discrete, and the sticks 
in the bundle could be described and inventoried without 
concern for soils, vegetation, or elevation. Economists liked this 
new idea because it helped package the land as a marketable 
commodity. Lawyers liked it as well, for the more theoretical 
and abstract the law became, the more the law seemed like a 
distinct, legitimate discipline, as rigorous and logical as any 
natural science. Detached from real people and real places, law 
could operate with all the predictability of Newtonian physics.133  
132    Max Oelschlaeger, Postmodern Environmental Ethics , p. 7. 
133 Freyfogle p. 97.
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     The claims made by MacKinnon, West, Warren, Plumwood, and other 
feminist theorists now become quite useful for illustrating the way that the 
philosophical presuppositions going into legal formulations determine the 
character of the outcome. Law is not separate from life. Law forms and 
mediates relationships according to the sorts of assumptions on which it is 
founded. Law, predicated on assumptions like those underlying the culturally 
dominant notion of private property is founded on a perspective that has 
been located by feminists to be a male rather than a simply human 
perspective: a perspective in which “logical,” “objective,” and “abstract” are 
privileged modes of discourse134 while the sort of specificity and 
interdependency that is characteristic of human and ecosystemic relationships 
is repudiated.135 Law itself is a reflection of the same conceptual frameworks 
which gave rise to classical science and political liberalism. Both are founded 
upon a philosophy of ontological separatism. This philosophy holds that the 
natural and cultural worlds consist of radically isolated, atomistic particles 
that are only peripherally in contact with others. According to Freyfogle’s 
account, the evolution of property law followed closely the development and 
application of modernist conceptions of truth, legitimacy, and physical being. 
When the law could treat land as though it were something separate from 
human beings, from which humans can create economic value but is not 
valuable in itself, it was also possible to detach that value and transform it 
into an abstract concept, stripped of the annoying particularities that might 
render it less manageable, and certainly less transferable.
134 See ch. 1. 
135 This, of course, is precisely why socialist feminism provides a more ecologically adequate 
political framework from which to fashion an ecofeminist environmental jurisprudence.
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      Interlude: Feminist Primatology and Environmental Law: Changing  
the Field of Possibilities 
      Masculinist, modernist modes of thought are not limited to law, and are 
being currently challenged in a number of disciplines by theorists and 
practitioners who are unraveling the deep interconnections between what 
have hitherto thought of as discrete disciplines. In Primate Visions: Gender 
Race and Nature in the World of Modern Science        136   postmodern feminist 
Donna Haraway provides a startling analysis of anthropology and 
primatology as fields which are charged with particular conceptions of the 
nature/culture interaction, conceptions which are strongly implicated in the 
modernist project of ecosocial domination—where land, animals, and 
women are instrumentalized and stripped of subjectivity. Primate Visions  
presents primatology as a field where the definitions of male and female, 
intelligent and dumb, nature and culture, human and animal are actively 
being negotiated. Haraway’s argument that primatology is a western, 
masculinist, and sexualized discourse that has been pivotal in creating and 
reproducing the narratives of power-entitlement and human superiority 
leading to the domination and thus destruction can be of use also to the 
development of ecofeminist legal theory, for 
The hope is that in the de/reconstructions of woman and 
female going on internationally in science and politics, 
there is emerging a field for envisioning fruitfully 
contradictory and multiple possibilities for new links 
136 Donna Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science  
(New York: Routlege,1989). 
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between knowledge and power, for new apparatuses of 
bodily production for craftily reinventing what it means 
to be—always situated, always specified—human.137    
      To resist this definition of humanbeingness that Haraway offers—humans 
as radically situated in particular historical, social, and natural 
contexts—would be a predictible and consistent move on the part of those 
whose ideologies are shaped by the dominant constructions of reality.  In the 
case of property owners, resisting a definition of the human subject as 
enmeshed with and thus obligated to non-human others ensures that the 
only inhibitions to the full development of their land are market ones. But 
here we arrive at one of the central dilemmas of postmodernism. To simply 
presume that  denials of notions such as Haraway’s are a reactionary response 
forwarded by of those benefited by belonging to the privileged 
race/sex/class/species would be easy, perhaps too easy. Is something deeper is 
going on here? What is really at stake by agreeing to a definition of science (or 
law) that is “charged with the bio-politics of being primate”?138 What might be 
lost, and what might be gained, through such an understanding, and how 
does this understanding affect the project of  constructing a postmodern and 
ecofeminist environmental jurisprudence?
     What is lost through a postmodern inquiry is the possibility of ground. 
Neutralized and destabilized is the fixed definition of what counts as reality 
offered by modernity, and along with it the promise of a sure understanding 
of the workings of politics and human nature. So too is lost moral authority. 
To understand primatology, law, ecology, philosophy, etc. as discourses that 
137 Haraway, Primate Visions ,  p. 286-287.
138 Ibid., p. 286.
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are not superficially but deeply   interpenetrated with, actually consisting of, 
invented meanings, textual language-games, and power-interests is to in 
some senses admit to a radical subjectivity, and thus a world in which no 
agent can claim a higher authority for his/her actions and beliefs. Such an 
admission is not only disturbing to those invested in the  hegemonic, 
business-as-usual world of corporate-capitalism, it is equally unsettling for 
those wishing to embark on the different and difficult project of political 
restructuring and environmental repair, for it leaves those agents too 
without a transcendent claim to moral superiority and action in the name of 
what is “right.”139 Even less so are they left with a sure, scientfically-ordained 
prescription to fix things.  Instead, an appreciation for and utilization of a 
feminist postmodern methodology at best yields an “ability to destabilize the 
narrative fields that gave rise to both primatology and feminism, thereby 
generating the possibility of new stories not strangled by the same logics of 
appropriation and domination, but also not innocent of the workings of 
power and desire including new exclusions.”    140    
     But in the game of determination of which set of values shall rule human 
praxis and institutions, do we then merely rid ourselves (deconstruct) the old 
narrative of white male superiority and replace it with the new and 
improved “feminist” ideology, in the belief that the traditional values of 
femininity will clean up the mess the boys have made in the living room? 
     No. Although it has been by now thoroughly established in the literature 
that such a reversal is a naive understanding of the feminist project and 
139 In fact, this is one of the reasons why Critical Legal Studies meets such opposition in legal 
philosophy, for it asserts that there is no one “right” way to understand the law; rather there are a 
multiplicity of “correct” interpretations. 
140 Haraway, Primate Visions,  p. 288 (emphasis added).
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counter to its goals, it is still difficult for those inhabiting a world shaped by 
masculinist discourse to become free of such oppositional, binary thinking. 
Thus assertions that the objective of feminism is not to replace male 
dominance with female dominance (because of course that would just 
reproduce the same problem) bear repeating. “The intersection [of feminism 
and primate studies] works not by replacing feminist stories for masculinist 
ones, or scientific stories for ideological ones, truths for representations, but 
by restructuring the whole field of possibilities .”      141  To restructure the field 
of possibilities for Haraway requires as a precondition the deconstruction of 
origin-stories about human beings and the revelation of how the 
unavoidable biases due to social positioning of researchers have deeply but 
not unalterably influenced the way we view our simian relatives and thus 
our own relationship to what we call “nature.” But it cannot stop there. 
Humans, and particularly those involved in the project of environmental 
ethics, must deconstruct old stories while simultaneously inventing new 
ones about our relationship with the natural world. To deconstruct and 
invent within legal discourse is the purpose of an ecofeminist environmental 
jurisprudence.   And one story is not as good as another. 
     So here, then, is what is gained through postmodern feminist approaches 
to the discourses of nature and culture. Even if we lose the sureness a master 
narrative ostensibly provides concerning our ontological position toward and 
epistemological access to nature, we acquire the ability to tell a story that 
simultaneously deconstructs the notion of humans as “outside” of nature 
and narratively repositions humans as embedded in matirices of ecological 
141Ibid, p. 303 (emphasis added) . 
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and social relations. In this story, humanity does not conquer and by so doing 
ultimately forfeit its presence in this remarkable biological web, but 
negotiates, converses with the earth as an agent and a subject in order to leave 
open the ability to continue to intercourse with natural beings in an 
evolutionary setting. “When biology is practiced as a radically situational 
discourse and animals are experienced/constructed as active, non-unitary 
subjects in complex relation to each other and to writers and observers, the 
gaps between discourses on nature and culture seem very narrow indeed.”142  
     Destabilizing established, authoritative fields of discourse such as science 
and law and recrafting the story of metaphysical separation to one of 
ontological embeddedness requires a tremendous amount of courage and 
imagination. If one accepts that sex and the social meaning of gender is 
implicated in the modernist practice of environmental mastery and control, 
then one must also accept that those occupying the “marked” sex must play 
an active and in many ways uncomfortable role in moving the analysis of 
race/class/gender from the periphery to the center of the conversation. One 
must keep bringing it up, again and again. This is not to say that it is a 
requirement that one be female or that this is all  which is required in order 
to challenge the hierarchical structuring of western society. As Haraway notes, 
destabilizing a story-field requires that many things be done, and there are 
many roles to play. As well, to even be aware that change is needed and to 
envision/invent that change means that “one must be formed at a social 
moment when change is possible.”143 
      That social moment is now .     Narrating other stories requires collective 
142Ibid., p. 375.
143Ibid, p. 303. 
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action. It is not solely an intellectual undertaking appearing and affecting only 
the world of the scholarly written page but is a material practice, affecting 
actual lives. Stories, narratives, discourses set the conditions of life by 
informing us of what it means to be who we are, dialectically influencing 
political institutions and practices. Since law in the west is predicated upon a 
particular notion of what it means to be a human being, and that notion is 
the liberalist notion of radical individualism and ontological separation, to 
challenge human origin-stories that claim that fundamental motor of 
evolution is competition and aggression, and that human survival was/is 
made possible by male-dominated hierarchical social structuring (as the 
anthropologists in Haraway’s book have done) is to also tug on and loosen 
these narrative threads in that part of the social fabric that delineates law. 
Law, like science, is a narrative that tells stories, typically stories embedded in 
Hobbesian conceptions of innate intra-human competition and Lockean 
notions of earth-ownership as an inalienable right. These narratives are not 
unlike (and in fact are the inspiration for) the paleo-scientific stories told by 
first- and second-generation primatology asserting that the essence of 
humanbeingness is to be a singular male technology-wielder and 
appropriator of female bodies. Environmental law, at least in its radical 
potentiality, challenges the notion that human beings are/ought to be the 
rightful/lawful owners and possessors of nature. Feminist law seeks to 
demonstrate that the liberal-industrial state operates through the 
appropriation of female (and that of males with “minority” status) labor and 
reproductive ability, exploiting both in the maintenance of capitalism. 
Through using a socialist feminist methodology, a feminist environmental 
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jurisprudence contests these received meanings of the boundary between 
nature and culture, male/female, self and other as they are expressed in legal 
and scientific discourse, and also makes explicit the intense but usually 
concealed normativity attached to these concepts. An ecofeminist 
environmental jurisprudence will also empower the movement to end 
oppression, will help to re-craft, re-invent a story of the human/nature 
interrelation that locates being in the field of ecosocial dynamism in which 
contextuality and specificity consequentially figure.
     Possible Models for an Ecofeminist Environmental Jurisprudence: The    
     New Zealand Resource Management Act
     To this juncture I’ve argued that at this historical moment there is urgent 
need of ways in which to politically and legally recognize the needs of the rest 
of nature. As well, we must encourage the institutions through which we 
live our lives and structure our society to foster a healthy, sustainable 
interaction between human beings and the natural world. Conventional legal 
approaches toward nature, such as those exemplified in much of past and 
present-day property law, have shown themselves to be inadequate for a 
cluster of interrelated reasons: land is seen as an abstract, economic-value 
producing entity to be used strictly for anthropocentric purposes, human 
activities are thought to operate outside of nature, and parcels of land are 
utilized without regard to their particular location and function within a 
specific ecosystem. However, certain attempts are being made within the 
western world to correct such approaches toward environmental policy and 
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to create discourses that encourage more healthy, sustainable, and inclusive 
nature/culture relationship in ways that are consistent with an ecofeminist 
environmental jurisprudence. I will conclude the body of this thesis by 
examining one such example, the New Zealand Resource Management Act of 
1991, in this light.144 
   The New Zealand Resource Management Act of 1991 (hereafter referred to 
as the RMA), according to Alastair Gunn and Carolyn McCallig, “is a 
comprehensive and philosophically grounded statute that was the first of its 
kind in the world.”145  Indeed, this law does appear to actually codify and thus 
bring into material reality many notions which lie at the heart of a socially 
just and ecologically healthy world-narrative. In sharp contrast to the 
powerful devotion to liberal neutrality built in to the American system of 
justice,146 the RMA  is the overriding “law of the land” in New Zealand, that 
is, its dictates take precedence over all other legal and political decision-
making. Its explicit purpose is to provide a legal mechanism (narrative) 
through which the overall long term-health and sustainability of an 
integrated human and non-human environment can be realized; and thus 
“[t]here is no pretense that the Act is ‘value-free’—on the contrary [the Act 
contains] a clear statement of and commitment to explicit values.”147 
         An aspect of the act which deepens its interest to those involved in 
144 Alastair S. Gunn and Carolyn McCallig, “Environmental Values and Environmental Law in New 
Zealand,” Ethics and the Environment  (2, (2); 103-120 (1997)). 
145 Ibid., p. 103.
146 Another point about liberal neutrality and political liberalism is that it claims to privilege no one 
conception of “the good life”; in practice however, such a non-commitment to explicitly normative 
values on the part of the state can be shown to actually privilege the sort of laissez-faire capitalism 
and policy of governmental non-interference that seriously degrade natural (and cultural) 
environments. 
147 Ibid., p.118. 
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theorizing environmental law is that in drafting the RMA the government 
consulted widely with many groups, including the usual business and 
economic interests, but also, remarkably, with environmental philosophers 
and academics. Incorporated into the design of the law are notions of intrinsic 
worth and obligations to future generations, a not-so-minor miracle when 
one considers that these are the very notions that are decidedly (and often 
deliberately) underrepresented in conventional legal discourse and 
environmental policymaking. Thus the act has a “philosophical tone” and 
some of the most “central concepts and values in environmental ethics are 
built into the Act.”148 The RMA is fluid, as is the emerging wetlands law with 
in the United States discussed in the previous section. As well, it explicitly 
recognizes the non-economic value of the environment. These features, like 
those of new directions in wetlands law, exemplify a postmodern and/or 
feminist approach. 
     One particularly remarkable feature of the RMA is its incorporation of 
Maori concepts and values. Since the recognition of voices of marginalized 
“others” is a defining aspect of both postmodern and feminist approaches, 
this feature alone locates the RMA as a model (but not a master) narrative for 
the development of an ecofeminist environmental jurisprudence.
      The Maori are indigenous inhabitants of the island of New Zealand, and 
were subjugated by the British when New Zealand was colonized in 1840.149 
Although the Treaty of Waitangi was signed at that time, ostensibly 
recognizing a partnership between the British and the Maori and alotting 
Maori control of traditional lands, the treaty has been only spottily enforced 
148 Ibid., pp. 105-6.
149 Ibid., p. 107.
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until the enactment of the RMA.150 The RMA, however, recognizes and gives 
statutory authority to many key Maori concepts, including the notion of 
kaitiakitanga,   a term which for the purposes of the Act is taken to mean 
“The exercise of guardianship; and in relation to a resource, includes the ethic 
of stewardship based on the nature of the resource itself.”151  Gunn and 
McCallig emphasize that this obligation to exercise stewardship in a manner 
consistent with the “natural character” of the land and which maintains its 
ecosystemic functioning  is not an obligation imposed only on the Maori, but 
on “everyone who is exercising functions and powers under the act,”152  that is 
to say, everyone. Other Maori concepts incorporated into the act include a 
recognition of the importance of waahi tapu   (sacred places), taonag   (literally 
“treasure”; they are not limited to physical things but include practices and 
customs), and the ultimate authority of the tangata whenua,   people of the 
land. 153   
     The ontological conception of the nature/culture interconnection 
contained in the RMA approximates the concept of ontological embeddedness 
which I argue must take a central role in the development of an ecologically 
sound and socially just environmental jurisprudence. Although termed the 
New Zealand Resource Management    Act, the meaning of resources in the 
RMA is considerably broadened, to include “‘land, water, air, soils, minerals, 
and energy, all forms of plants and animals (whether native to New Zealand 
150 Ibid.
151 New Zealand Resource Management Act, section 2 and 7 (a); quoted  in Gunn and McCallig p. 
108. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid., p. 107. An interesting incidental from an ecofeminist perspective is that according to 
Gunn and McCallig, whenua   means both “land” and “placenta.”
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or introduced), and all structures’.”154 Finally, the RMA adopts a “system 
perspective where the whole is recognized to be greater than the sum of its 
parts.”155 Particularly interesting is the legislative history of this aspect of the 
RMA.
In the Resource Management Law Reforms discussions, 
problems such as pollution, soil erosion, species extinction, and 
deforestation were seen as stemming largely from the practice of 
managing land, air, and water separately...The Reform Group 
[The group responsible for the wording of the law] decided that 
to be effective, environmental policy should not limit itself to 
the consideration of ‘resources in isolation’; environmental 
management is not just a matter of resource exploitation. The 
sustainability objective cannot be achieved by dividing the 
environment into separate resources ....    To refer simply to the 
extraction of resources is to ignore the whole   ecosystem from 
which the resource has come.... The whole ecosystem must be 
functioning effectively if resource flows are to be available at all. 
The result has been that in recent legislation and policy it has 
become almost impossible to distinguish between a ‘resource’ 
and ‘environment.’   156 
     The concept of “environment” contained in the RMA is inclusive of 
humans— that is to say that human beings, in conventional environmental 
parlance, are considered to be “a part of” and not “apart from” the rest of the 
154 Ibid., p. 109.
155 Ibid. This concept of resource management is  clearly a far cry from the strongly anthropocentric 
“wise use” approach largely utilized in the United States. 
156 Ibid., p. 109 (emphasis added).
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natural world. This makes the RMA consistent with Merchant’s notion of a 
partnership ethic discussed in Chapter 3, as the needs and interests of human 
communities are accounted for within the requirements of the act, but 
human “needs” are interpreted to be those activities which promote long 
term ecological sustainability and “the more fundamental societal goal of 
quality of life for individuals and communities.”157  The act recognizes 
accordingly that “sustainability is achieved by minimizing resource depletion, 
environmental degradation, cultural disruption, and social instability.”158  The 
act in addition fits my definition of adhering to an ecofeminist perspective by 
not locating its purpose in any one foundational, universal goal or value, but 
rather recognizes that a plurality of values (including  intrinsic ones) can 
justify the goal of ecological sustainability. It also perceives, in accordance 
with an ecofeminist understanding, that forms of oppression are 
interconnected, and acts upon this realization. 
     Conclusion: Making It Real
      Though the RMA is not unproblematic, and undoubtedly has many 
challenges ahead to face as traditional economic interests experience the affect 
it has on their ability to conduct business-as-usual, it clearly represents an 
approach far more comprehensive than anything yet tried in the United 
States, and thus has enormous potential as a liberating ecological narrative. 
Although various proposals have been floated, including Merchant’s 
“partnership ethic” and the new directions appearing in wetlands law, the 
state of contemporary environmental law in the United States  is largely 
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid. p. 110.
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characterized by piece-meal and incoherent approach to promoting a 
sustainable relationship between human beings and the natural world. While 
plurality and a multiplicity of approaches is to be commended in some 
contexts, such as deciding on an ecologically and ethically permissible course 
of action for a particular human or non-human community, perhaps it is 
time for something resembling the New Zealand Resource Management Act 
to be instituted on a comprehensive basis within the United States.  I must 
concur with Gunn and McCallig’s belief that
 For environmental ethics to make a difference, it needs to be 
incorporated into environmental law, just as an ethic of human 
rights found expression in the United States Civil Rights Acts. 
So far, environmental ethics has had little direct effect on 
legislation, despite the fact that it is over 20 years since 
Christopher Stone attempted to provide a basis for the legal 
protection of natural systems and places in terms of their 
intrinsic value. New Zealand environmental law thus provides 
a useful opportunity to study environmental ethics in practice.159 
     Conclusion   
     The New Zealand Resource Management Act is, then, a story, which for 
we culture-dwelling storytellers perched on the cusp of postmodernity, facing 
the political and ecological exigencies of our time, is better than some others 
that can be told.  Stories such as this one, which can be incorporated and 
echoed by environmental law, can lead us in the direction of sustainable 
159 Ibid., p. 105 (citation omitted).
94
ecological and social relations. Such relations would not be founded on 
oppression, separation, and exploitation but would be reflective of the 
understanding that we are ontologically engaged in deep connections with 
human and more-than-human others, and that oppressive discourses 
embraced by patriarchy can and must be dismantled.  Law is one of the most 




       My purpose in the preceeding pages has been to confront with perhaps the 
aim of dissolving the disciplinary boundaries lying between the fields of 
philosophy, ecology, feminism, and law. In contemporary times, it is 
becoming increasingly recognized that fields of inquiry which refuse to 
acknowledge the interdependency of their epistemological and hermeneutic 
projects risk becoming ossified and parochialized, hazzard losing the influx of 
new combinations of ideas that ensure that they remain relevant and vital. In 
the case of liberatory discourses such as feminism, environmental 
philosophy, and jurisprudences that aim for social change, an active striving 
for interdisciplinarity is especially urgent and essential, as much more is at 
stake than simply the ability of a university department to maintain 
enrollment levels. If obsoletized, these disciplines will literally fail at the 
critically important endeavor of shifting the conceptual, institutional, and 
material structures of society toward health, equality, sustainablity and justice. 
Thus the disciplines I have engaged, characterized by their intent to not 
simply describe the world but also to change  it, must especially make the 
attempt to reach out to other analyses, to synthesize alternate approaches, to 
make connections with fields and projects beyond their own. 
     It is widely acknowledged that environmental problems in particular 
cannot be solved with singular approaches: environmental issues stem from 
the complex interplay of history (including natural history), technology, and 
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culture, and they require for understanding and resolution the participation 
of those schooled in the sciences, philosophy, politics, literature, 
anthropology, communications, economics...the list goes on. Feminism too 
has learned quickly that the problem of women’s subordination has no 
simple cause nor single solution, and feminists have been particularly adept 
at doing coalition work both within and outside of the academy. In fact, I feel 
confident in suggesting that feminism is perhaps more responsible than any 
other academic field for spreading environmental ideas throughout mulitple 
discourses, since feminists themselves come from so many divergent 
disciplines and because cross-disciplinary dialogue is so central to feminist 
methodology and process.160 But as with theorizing itself, the work is never 
done, and this thesis is an attempt to continue the dialogue between areas of 
research that is so necessary to solve our planet’s ecosocial exigencies.     
     In this spirit of interdisciplinarity, what I have done here in a general sense 
is to explore the relationship law and gender have to philosophies of the 
environment and human ecology. Since environmental law as it is currently 
applied is largely driven by the way in which science takes the natural world 
to be, taking this work further, as I hope to do in a dissertation, would show 
even more directly the ways in which scientific knowledge of natural systems 
is shaped by anthropocentric conceptions of the nature/culture relationship, 
160 For example, in conducting my research for this thesis and for the classes which I have taught, 
especially a course in Feminist Political Philosophy, I have found repeated reference, both directly 
and more generally, to the fundamental ideas of environmental ethics and ecofeminism, including 
notions of intrinsic worth for nature, within feminist writings from many sources. To the extent that 
various discourses incorporate feminst perspectives (as is certainly becoming the trend within the 
academy), and to the extent that feminists incorporate environmental perspectives (which as I 
have observed, is being done actively and consistently), environmental ideas will continue to 
proliferate and infuse the thinking of many researchers and theorists. What is especially 
heartening in this regard is that feminist theorists are most likely to connect environmental 
problems with other issues of social and political justice.
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how modernist and foundationalist assumptions occurring within 
philosophy, science, and law intersect with and contribute to race, class, 
gender, and ecological oppression, and the role language plays in shaping 
consciousness of such things. But while I have asked in this thesis how the 
institutions and expressions of modernity reinforce the sorts of value systems 
which produce anthropogenic environmental degradation, I also have 
explored the potential institutions have for introducing important notions 
into the social discourse which may promote change in the way we relate to 
human and more-than-human others. Law, built though it may be upon 
premises that reinforce the western, male, capitalist status quo, does   have 
radical potential, and raising awareness of the divergent ubiquity of various 
forms of oppression “shifts the episteme...exposing the political behind the 
personal, the dominance behind the submission, participating in altering the 
balance of power subtly but totally.”161 Finding and exploiting these openings 
within our own political systems is important, because once the “cracks and 
fissures”162 are penetrated law can function as a positive feedback system 
which, like other non-linear systems, will dialectically pick up, alter, re-
translate, and send back out cultural messages which then become re-coded 
through other legal mechanisms, thus amplifiying the message and sending 
echoes and throughout the entire system. Change happens more quickly each 
time with each new reverberation, and for this reason narratives that 
encourage ecological health must be explicitly connected to other efforts to 
161 MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State,  p. 240.
162 Nancy Hirschman, “Revisioning Freedom: Relationship, Context, and the Politics of 
Empowerment” in Revisioning the Political: Feminist Reconstructions of Traditional Concepts in 
Western Political Theory,   eds.,  Nancy J. Hirschmann and Christine Di Stefano  (Boulder: 
Westview, 1996).
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alter the master narratives of domination and exploitation, since, as I have 
argued, forms of oppression are linked, and are thus repudiated in similar 
(but not identical) ways.     
    I have intended the overarching theme of this thesis to be the way in which 
law is a carrier of stories that can both hinder and enhance the promotion of 
ecological ideas in society, and how ecofeminism can contribute to the 
transformative projects of both environmental philosophy and feminist law. 
This argument has had two major prongs, one critical and one constructive.  
Carolyn Merchant asserts that “[s]cience is an ongoing negotiation with 
nonhuman nature for what counts as reality”163 By extention, disciplines such 
as political philosophy and jurisprudence are also negotiations between 
society and its observers (who are of course participants in that society 
also—there is no “view from nowhere”) for what counts as social reality. 
Thus my critical   task has been to delineate the ways in which institutions of 
modernity (such as law and science) have precipitated ecosocial crisis through 
the attempt to dialectically enforce mastery and control over nature and 
women. My constructive   task has been to explore alternate political 
ontologies, such as the one proferred by socialist feminism, which challenge 
the classical liberalist view of the (human) individual as a radically isolated, 
discrete, autonomous being.  Ecofeminism and environmental ethics suggests 
that we exist in relationship and that humans—like other processes and 
entities occurring within nature—possess and ontology not of separation but 
of interconnection. This understanding of being I have defined as an ontology 
of embeddedness, and I have argued that this insight is shared by feminist 
163 Carolyn Merchant, Ecological Revolutions (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1989), p. 4. 
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jurisprudentialists that can be combined with ecofeminism in such a way as 
to revision the ideas and assumptions which inform environmental law.  
     Catharine MacKinnon has said that “a feminist theory of the state has 
barely been imagined, systematically, it has never been tried.”164 So too has a 
theory of environmental jurisprudence which takes seriously the insights of 
ecofeminism (or even of environmental ethics) barely been imagined, and 
never (except in New Zealand!) systematically tried. It is time to rectify this. 
Law under liberal premises objectifies women, supports narrow, eco-
destructive economic interests under the guise of rational neutrality, treats 
nature as a resource, and distances humans from the other-than-human-
world in which we are embedded. Socialist feminist ontological premises, 
which contain assumptions about human nature which put us firmly in this 
world and in direct, necessary, and fulfilling contact with human and earth 
others can and should be actively incorporated into our legal and political 
institutions. A scattered number of examples—the New Zealand Resource 
Management Act, wetlands law—exist which incorporate principles 
consistent with an ecofeminist perspective, and these should be investigated, 
the insight and information they contain gleaned for application to other 
cases and policies. 
    I will close by stating that I think it true that the words of  MacKinnon, 
regarding the predicted doom of a feminist jurisprudence, apply equally to an 
ecofeminist environmental jurisprudence: “It will be said that [eco]feminist 
law cannot win and will not work. But this is premature. Its possibilities 
cannot be assessed in the abstract but must engage the world.”165 
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